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Introduction 
The CODESRIA/UNESCO project proposal on the 'socio-economic analysis 
of the problem of hunger and food sel f -suf f ic iency ' focuses on a largely 
neglected aspect of the food crisis in A f r i ca : the nature and origin 
of food demand. Thus while studies now abound on the various factors 
constricting supply, the demand side of the problems still remains a 
terra incognita, so that even where it is addressed, as in studies on food 
sel f -suf f ic iency, it is still perceived largely in terms of how supply can 
be organised to satisfy demand (increased agricultural productivity) or 
alternatively how demand can be modified to correspond with supplies 
(l imitation of population growth)J 
There is also growing and widespread recognition that the prevention of 
hunger and malnutrition is primarily but not wholly dependent on overall 
food intake, and that there is a need to be concerned simultaneously 
with the rate of increase in food production, especially with the means by 
which production is increased as it is acknowledged that ceter is paribus 
unless there is an absorption of the rural labour fo rce into productive 
employment, even a large increase in food output will leave many households 
with inadequate access to food supplies, so that scalar indices on nutrition and 
poverty cannot take us beyond the description and mapping out of the problem 
of hunger, whose inter face is to be found at level of the ' food equation', that: 
"Rather than as a race between food and population, the food 
equation is to be viewed as a dynamic balance in individual 
countries between food supply and demand that depends on complex 
relationships among a number of interacting variables. Equilibrium 
in this vital food equation can range from a low one of a small increase 
in food supplies and l i t t le purchasing power in the hands of the 
poor to high levels of each". 
Thus at the wider macro- leve l , the problem of hunger cannot be separated 
from that of e f f e c t s of 'industrialisation', as evidenced in Afr ican 
countries by 'barely escapable obligation to resort increasingly to food 
imports'. The whole issue of how Afr ican countries can transform 
their social relations into capitalist relations which are viable only at the 
price of being seriously dependent on the importation of food at manageable 
prices? , 
2 
The project, however, focuses on the impact of industrialisation on the 
alteration -of eating habits, and seeks to explore: 
a) to what extent the changes in dietary habits are causes or e f f e c t s 
of the problem of hunger? 
b) the impact of these changes on the ability of Afr ican countries to 
maintain their independence in the area of food supply. 
c ) ecological e f f e c t s and cultural aspects of productive behaviour 
where attempts have been made to meet new demands through local 
production. 
d) to what extent policies to wean consumers from acquired new tastes, are 
feasible, desirable and realistic? 
Further the project aims to shift emphasis f rom "a narrow agro-nutritional 
point of view and to focus more on the 'actor ' ( the consumer) whose impact 
on the agricultural production chain is o f ten acknowledged but has so 
if 
far received scant serious scienti f ic analysis". 
The project 's emphasis on socio-cultural aspects and 'the actor ' however calls 
for some methodological and conceptual caveats, in order to avoid some 
of the pitfalls of mainstream social science, and also in order to pose 
questions for further research into the whole question of the transition 
from pre-capitalist to capitalist social relations of production. Dietary 
changes, we are o f ten told, are a function of socio-cultural processes, 
with the result that food preferences are the last things to change in 
any culture: 
"Each individual learns the food preferences and taboos of 
his or her culture at a very early age, even in infancy, modifying 
them according to personal taste but rarely breaking with them 
to any great extent. Because they are learned so early, they later 
serve as a basis for much further cultural acquisition, forming part 
of the unquestioned foundation of the whole system of bel iefs and 
values. For this reason it is d i f f icul t to persuade people to 
change their diet in ways not envisaged by their culture or even 
to contemplate change". 
An emphasis on such a phenomenon as diet, linked to an attempt to understand 
the 'actor ' , easily f i ts in with mainstsream neo-classical approaches whereby 
economic and social processes are defined as choices in the f a ce of scarcity, 
and the focus is zeroed-in on the deductive analysis of the logic of economising 
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to the neglect of comparative analysis of actual social institutions and behaviour 
historically associated with production and consumption. 
Nutritional theories on dietary habits are related to confl ict ing socio-economic 
theories and like these they tend to f i t most comfortably with di f fer ing sets of 
ideological bel iefs. Thus, the genetic potential model is premised on the 
fol lowing assumptions: 
/ * " 
(1) that the human body is a system which is not only self-regulating, 
but self-optimising, so that for each individual there is postulated 
to exist a preferred, state characterised by a unique set of values of 
the variables which describe the system's components (weight, height, 
blood levels etc ) . The preferred states are optimal for that individual 
with respect to all aspects of function. If there are no constraints 
on diet, or continued adverse environmental influences, an individual 
will always tend to seek out and return to the preferred state. 
(2) individuals d i f f e r f rom one another with respect to the values of the 
component variables which characterise their preferred state and with 
respect to the levels of performance of which they are capable when 
at their optimum. These inter individual d i f ferences are seen as 
inherent and result f rom di f fer ing genetic constitutions. Individuals 
who are prevented from returning to the preferred state, because of 
dietary or other constraints, are regarded as malnourished in the sense 
of being in a non-optimal condition. 
(3) States of malnutrition/hunger are detected and graded for severity 
by the extent of deviation of one or more stated variables f rom the 
preferred levels. Malnutrition results in either a sub-optimal response to 
to a current stress or to an increased risk of failure at some t ime. 
The genetic potential model finds its corollary in the 'subjective preference 
theory' , wherein people are believed to have an innate tendency to express 
a consistent set of preferences as between the various items they want to buy.^ 
From such premises, various attempts are then made to predict how consumption 
would be distributed^within a society 'where a f r e e market ' operates, and 
for how many people food consumption would fal l below biological needs. 
The 'subjective preference ' aspect of the dominant neo-classical economic 
view leads the nutritionist who favours the genetic potential model of human 
nutrient requirements to suppose that malnourished people can be taught to 
make 'rational' choices of foodstuffs. Hence a need for nutrition 
education is identif ied in most recommendations; simultaneously f rom a 
'cost of production' perspective it is also considered vital to attack hunger 
which is a 'social l iability' by improving the growth potential and work 
capacity of adults and children through supplementary feeding so that they 
can be made fully productive and disease-resistant, thus breaking out of the 
trap of the vicious cyc le of undernutrition - disease - sub-optimal production 
- further poverty - more undernutrition. 
In such a model as sketchily outlined above, it is clear that improvements in 
the quality of l i f e , greater choice or even increased security and 
economic independence are not counted as feasible project outputs. It is 
seen as necessary for the state f irst to increase its stock of human capital; 
redistribution of consumption comes later, that 'is if the market is permitted 
to operate e f f i c i ent ly . 
This approach has been criticised for being static and for using the 
present as some kind of abstract historical mechanism which pays scant 
attention to real historical processes. The socio-economic analysis of hunger 
is best approached from a "social cost perspective" which involves the 
identif ication of a class experiencing actual physiological damage or who 
have adapted to the fullest possible extent to low food intakes, and are 
therefore at a high risk of becoming malnourished. This calls for an 
analysis which goes beyond the immediate biological ones - one which identif ies 
the particular nature of the resources constraints or socio-economic 
dependencies which made the adaptive response necessary in the f irst place, 
and more importantly analyses the processes and relationships that have 
generated this lack of food security in the past and those likely to do so in 
the future. 
Though such an approach has many advantages over the subjective preference/ 
genetic model, it can lead to an oversimplif ication of the whole problem of 
dietary changes and the role of the consumer, by ignoring the problematic 
of the transition from non-capitalist to capitalist forms of production, 
and its cultural dimensions as manifested in actual socio-cultural 
practices such as diet. From a 'realist ' interpretation of Marx's 
theory of modes of production, one could postulate the existence of a 
mechanism(s) which, if it were to exist, would explain the empirically 
observable phenomena of hunger and changing consumption patterns in A f r i ca . 
This mechanism(s) may be invisible to our normal sense experience, although 
typically indices of its existence abound in the reports of international 
agencies. Clearly, within capitalism it can be held that the production 
and appropriation of surplus - value constitute such a mechanism - and 
Marx details the origins of the phenomenal forms this gives rise to -
prices, wages, profits, interest etc. However, as John Urry argues, such a 
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conception is problematic in two respects. First, it can lead to 
viewing such societies as characterised by an 'expressive to ta l i ty ' , that 
all aspects or elements of it are merely the phenomenal forms of the 
logic of the working out of the mechanism. And second, no account will 
emerge of the precise kinds of practice which individuals would have to 
engage in, so that these phenomenal forms are generated. 
We there fore need, with re ference to Afr ican societies, to begin to get a 
clear understanding of changing cultural practices such as 'diet ' as 
attributes of 'civi l society ' , and attempt to delineate some of the 
continuities and discontinuities between the pre-colonial civi l societies 
and the colonial ones. For, whereas, the conditions under which exchange 
takes place have in part been determined by the state, the patterning of 
consumption - is largely determined outside production itsel f , within 
the-sphere of civi l society. And labour power, unlike all other commodities, 
is not produced by capitalists for prof it . It is produced or reproduced in 
the sphere of civi l society. So while all other commodities are produced within 
capitalist production, labour power is produced outside capitalist relations 
of production.^ 
i 
There fore in analysing the complex relationships involved in changing 
consumption patterns it is important to avoid seeing just the logic of 
capitalism at work. 
The paper that fo l lows will be by no means an attempt to broach all of the 
theoretical issues posed above, and much of it will rather be suggestive of 
areas which still require research and cannot be dealt with in the paper. 
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A CHARACTERISATION OF THE FOOD CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE. 
The socio-economic, dimensions of hunger in Zimbabwe are primarily not 
related to the problems of maximisation of aggregate food production. 
In Zimbabwe the latter aspect would be meaningless without re ference to 
the hierarchy of needs and values which have their basis on the nature 
of the structure of the pre-1980 settler political economy. 
Thus, in spite of being a substantial food surplus nation, Zimbabwe has a 
malnutrition problem of major proportions. Upward of 20% of children 
under f i v e have second or third degree malnutrition and nearly 30% are 
stunted while the infant mortality rate compares relatively favourably 
with those of other Afr ican countries. On the other hand on malnutrition 
statistics, Zimbabwe shows up badly by comparison. The percentage of 
children under f i v e (20%) of the under-five population showing second or 
third degree malnutrition based on weight for age is roughly comparable 
to figures for Cameroon, Lesotho and Liberia. Results of the immunisation 
coverage survey conducted in July 1984 indicated that undernutrition is a 
significant problem. In the survey, 777 children were weighed and it was 
found that 16% of the children, 1 2 - 5 9 months, were malnourished. Stunting 
was found in 28% of Zimbabwean children, compared to 9% in Togo, 18% in 
Liberia and 21-24% in Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Egypt J 0 
The discrepancy between the infant mortality rate and malnutrition is due 
to the possibility that Zimbabwe presents a relatively safer ' infection 
environment than many other Afr ican countries'. ^ It is d i f f icul t to 
compare these f igures with the pre-1980 conditions, because not much 
information was col lected on nutrition conditions in rural areas. And 
even what there is, is largely based on hospital admissions - but it is 
important to bear in mind the uneven and inequitable population coverage 
by health services, so that given the incomplete nature of the health 
statistics, those groups most a f f e c t ed by malnutrition have been those 
groups that have had the least access to health services and whose sufferings 
most likely went unrecorded. This state of a f fa i rs is comparable to the 
answer given by a Brazilian researcher to a question on the incidence of 
snake bites. He replied that: 
r 
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"It is d i f f i cul t to know, since where there are statistics there 
are no snakes and where there are snakes there are no 
statistics". 
The figures cited may there fore just be the tip of the iceberg. ' A health 
expert with Oxfam, Dr. David Saunders, recently said that many cases of 
malnourishment in children in Zimbabwe go undetected by health workers 
12 
because they do not use the necessary detection methods. 
A 1973 study of paediatric admissions to Harare Hospital found that 
severe malnutrition in the form of marasmus or kwashiorkor (which 
• • 
re f lects gross def ic iencies of calories and or protein, was the f irst, 
second, or third diagnosis for one-third of the 2 354 children admitted. 
In that year malnutrition was the second most common reason for admission 
and was the leading cause of death (31% - i.e. more than double anything 
else). In 1978 of 3 958 people hospitalised with nutritional deficiencies, 
17,4% died. This was double the percentage of fatal i t ies f rom other 
diseases except pneumonia. In 1979, nutrition problems were the direct 
13 cause for about 5% of all hospital deaths. 
There are now several studies on the distribution of malnutrition in 
Zimbabwe, though most of them are mere estimates. But there is still 
very l i t t le in the way of studies that link malnutrition to the productive 
processes - the latter is either ignored entirely or subsumed under the 
spatial categories of rural/urban or treated in the most superficial 
way as 'occupation' - or 'income' or economic level . Thus in the ranking 
of malnourished groups, farm workers who with their famil ies constitute 
approximately 25% of Zimbabwe's population, are the worst o f f . In a 
commercial farming area in Matabeleland in 1981, 14% of children in 
Beitbridge and 20% in Nyamandlovu were judged to be severely malnourished 
based on weight for age, the range was from 10% on some farms to 47% on 
another. And in a survey of 227 children carried out on farms in 
Mashonaland, Raf f ingora District - 24% of children suffered from second 
or third degree malnutrition and 49% showed some stunting. Further 
samples in a 30 ki lometre radius of Bindura found 53,4% of children 
measured were stunted, and that over half had second or third degree 
malnutrition. ' ^ A t present, the minimum wage of Z$55 per month is less 
than half the estimated poverty datum income level . And, in spite of the 
government's e f f o r t s to minimise the displacement of farm workers, 
fol lowing the promulgation of minimum wage legislation, it is estimated 
that there was a loss of 51 000 permanent jobs between 1980 and 1982. In 
1983 employment in agriculture registered a further decline of 2 , 8 % J 5 
The next worst o f f group in terms of malnutrition have been the inhabi-
tants of the communal areas. Infant mortality rates based on the 1969 
census were two and a half to four times higher in rural areas than in 
urban areas. A 1975 study showed that the malnutrition problem in 
the communal areas was four to f i v e times as bad as it was in urban or 
semi-urban populations. And four reports f rom the Mutoko area in 1980 
showed that the nutrition problem among peasant farmers in communal areas 
was more than four t imes as great as for those living in townships J ^ 
As a result of enforced excessive human and livestock population, the 
resource base of these areas has for long been under severe stress making 
many households dependent on o f f - f a rm income of migrant members for 
subsistence. In the Gwanda area, for instance, severe malnutrition was to 
be six times higher in famil ies where the migrant did not send remittances 
compared to those where he did. The least amount of malnutrition appeared 
in those famil ies where the father did not migrate but someone else sent 
remittances. ^ In recent years the e f f e c t s of drought, compounded by the 
deterioration of employment prospects, has led to a crisis situation for 
the 2,65 million people living in areas where 'simply producing a bare 
18 
subsistence crop is considered to be a good year ' . 
So far as food and nutrition, the 'privi lege ' of urban low-income famil ies 
is only very relat ive and it could not be otherwise, if as a 1974 studv 
19 
states, the income of most of them was below the poverty datum line. 
A 1976/1977 survey of lower income urban households found an average 
monthly income of $80,92 (20% of this population earned $50 a month, 
60% between $51 and $110 and 20% above $111). This compared to a 
poverty datum line requirement in September 1978 of $107 a month for 
the average-sized fami ly . The Riddell Commission in 1980 updated the 
1974 study to take into account changes in the cost of living and the 
introduction of minimum wage legislation, and came up with an estimate 
of $128,52. The minimum wage in industry and commerce was $85 with e f f e c t 
from January 1, 1981. By the end of 1983, the minimum wage in the 
industrial and commercial sectors had reached $128,72. But by the end of 20 1983, the P.D.L. has been calculated to have been $201. 
There fore even at a superficial level, and with re ference to fragmentary 
pieces of data, it is clear that Zimbabwe faces a major hunger problem. It 
- 9 -
is also clear that the worst a f f e c t ed classes are the urban poor and those 
• 
rural poor who do not produce part or all of the. food they consume. A 
considerable proportion of present hunger/malnutrition is also to be 
found among households that produce most or all of the food they consume. 
Long-term changes in cropping systems have largely determined the amounts 
and kinds of foods produced. The reasons for calorie - protein deficiencies 
obviously d i f f e r among the d i f ferent groups, primary reasons likely to 
be low household incomes, insufficient food intakes and high food prices. 
Changes in any of these factors have influenced food consumption. But 
from a nutritional point of v iew, only changes in food consumption by 
households within which some or all of the members are now malnourished or 
in which the risk of malnutrition is significant are of interest. With 
the present euphoria about the good rains and the expected bumper 
harvest for 1985, it would be t imely to sound a cautionary note on placing 
too much emphasis on food supplies, for : 
"... changes in food supplies a f f e c t the nutritional status 
only to the extent that food consumption of malnourished or 
at - risk individuals is a f f ec ted . The degree to which expanded 
food production is translated into expanded food consumption 
by the malnourished varies depending on the crop or l ivestock 
species of which production is expanded, the nature of technology 
that brings about the expansion and who produces the increase. 
Thus using total production expansio^as a proxy for nutrition?' 
e f f e c t is likely to be misleading ..." 
There is there fore a need to examine more closely nutrient aspects of the 
food consumed. Analyses carried out for the diets of 50 pregnant 
women in a district of Zimbabwe revealed a low content of protein, fa t , iron, 
22 
vitamin A, thiamin, riboflavin, niacin and ascorbic acid. Maize, the 
Zimbabwean staple diet, is also low in lysine and tryptophan. The bio-
chemical causes of malnutrition in Zimbabwe have largely been attributed 
to micronutrient def ic iencies related to calorie and to a lesser extent 
protein problems. The most common is pellagra, a nutritional disorder 
that is common in populations whose diets are heavily dependent on maize. 
It is characterised by scaly, peeling skin and cracked f i e ry lips. As 
far back as the 1950s a study of patients at Harare Hospital showed that 
of 54 consecutive admissions for nutritional disease, 22 were cases of 
pellagra. Another study of nutritional disorders in 1971 found that 269 
of 361 mostly adult cases examined over three years were suffering from 
pellagra. The main cause of pellagra in Zimbabwe appears to be inadequate 
10 
niacin in a heavily maize-based diet, exarcebated by the increased 
23 
consumption of highly ref ined maize meal. 
Goitre, caused by iodine def ic iency, seems from the fragmentary data 
available to be quite prevalent.* An investigation cited by Berg, 
done in the Chimanda communal area, showed a 35% goitre prevalence 
among the studied population. A study among the Tonga in Omay in the 
1960s found 45% of the community with goitre. The highest rate (77%) was 
among adolescent girls. Another study around the same t ime in Chikwaka 
24 
communal area found in a sampled vi l lage population, a prevalence of 74%. 
Vitamin A def ic iency has been found to be widespread, especially f rom 
May to December - 'the measles1 season - and has been attributed to the 
lack of variety in the diet. 
Thus besides the preponderance of maize in the diet of the malnourished in 
Zimbabwe, the very lack of variety looms as a major contributory factor . 
It has been estimated that cereals now account for almost three-quarters of 
the calories consumed per capita - and maize accounts for slightly over 
three-quarters of the cereals. And less than 5% of these calories are 
consumed in such forms as mealie meal. Of the remaining calories only 4% 
were estimated to come in the form of oils and fats - three-quarters of this 
being of vegetable origin. F.A.O./W.H.O. recommendations prescribe that 15 -
20% of calories should be in the form of dietary fats. For Zimbabwe, the per-
capita intake in 1977, when livestock was more available (i.e. the catt le 
herd had dropped steadily from 6 500 000 herd in 1977 to 5 100 000 in 
1980), was a seemingly plentiful 74 grammes compared to 55 grammes in A f r i ca 
as a whole. But of this 18 grammes was in the form of animal protein 
(most likely consumed by high-income groups) and 56 in the form of vegetable 
protein - of the latter 88% was from cereals, and more than three-quarters 
25 of that amount f rom maize. 
The seriousness of dietary def iciencies is underlined by the appreciation of 
the fac t that malnutrition amongst infants in Zimbabwe is largely a post-
weaning phenomenon. Most deaths occur in the one to four years of age 
bracket, a f ter which there is a decline during school years. A 'weight for 
age' survey conducted in July 1984 covering 777 children in the 0 - 4 
age group, indicated increasing prevalence rates by age. 7% of children 
below one year, and 16% of children 1 - 4 years were undernourished. 
Shifts in dietary patterns from such crops as groundnuts and mil let to 
maize have had particularly serious nutritional consequences for infants 
and small children from the weaning stage - who do not have stomachs 
- 11 -
large enough to absorb in a day the calories they require f rom a bulky 
food such as maize por r idge .^ 
V 
While there can be l i t t le dispute on the bio-chemical aspects of hunger in 
Zimbabwe, the socio-economic analysis of its causes and also proposals 
for its eradication are more problematic. One finds it d i f f icul t to agree 
for instance with the Report of The Commission Into The Agricultural 
Industry's synopsis of the hunger problem in Zimbabwe: 
"Gains in productivity have been insufficient to keep up with 
population growth with the result that the average Zimbabwean is both 
poorer and hungrier today than he was in 1971. In e f f e c t , 
the very real gains in productivity achieved in the large-scale 
farming sector have been more ^ a n o f f se t by the agricultural 
decline in the communal areas". 
One finds in this a veiled attempt to depoliticise the whole problem of 
nutrition, because mass malnutrition persists today in Zimbabwe not 
primarily because of the low agricultural productivity of the communal areas, 
but because social relations of production and exchange of a particular 
type still prevail. Only specif ic social groups have been the victims of 
malnutrition - and the eradication of mass malnutrition in itself through 
raising the 'productivity ' of the communal areas, so that they 'catch up' with 
the large-scale commercial areas, cannot be put forward as a substitute for 
social change, and will only sharpen the instruments of social oppression 
inherited at independence of which mass malnutrition is but one 
manifestation. 
Further, the connection between the problems of low production growth and 
malnutrition is all but mysti f ied - and the 'commercial sector' and the 
communal sector are counterposed in a static fashion like two snapshots. 
Without attempting to show the dialectical relationship between them; the 
fac t that Zimbabwean agriculture has developed unevenly and along social 
class lines, does not emerge from a reading of the whole report of the 
Commission. 
The next section of the paper will attempt to contextualise changes in diet 
and production in Zimbabwe which throw some light on the current problem 
of hunger. 
CHANGES IN DIET AND PRODUCTION FROM THE END OF THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1980 : AN OVERVIEW 
From the manner in which we have characterised Zimbabwe's food crisis, 
the real main changes in dietary habits that concern us here are 
the changes to a largely maize-based diet and the decline in the animal 
protein component of the diet. But before attempting to patch some 
fragmentary historical data, it might at f irst be necessary to point out 
certain theoretical shortcomings in attempts to understand the 'consumer' 
in Zimbabwe. 
Studies in the social and economic history of Zimbabwe which have broached 
the whole subject of food habits have largely done so f rom a narrow 
institutional point of view - wherein for instance workers' protests against 
the inadequacies and poor quality of diet emerge as one of the many forms 
of 'worker consciousness' pitted against capital 's cost minimisation 
28 
strategies. So that while it is now feasible to trace dietary changes 
at the point of production largely as far as mine labour is concerned, 
through a scrutiny of institutional diets, diet does not emerge as an 
important index of changing material culture for the wider society. 
This state of a f fa i rs could be partly attributed to the topographical 
metaphor of the labour reserve whereby communal areas have been seen as 
29 
a labour reserve for mines, large farms and industry. What has been 
stressed from the perspective of the labour reserve have been firstly the 
institutional wage supply determinants, such as urban influx policies, 
and secondly the institutional restraints which have been applied to the 
'peasant economy' through the state's subsidisation of settler agriculture, 
land alienation policies e tc . in order to push peasants into wage employment, 
and to render them incapable of accumulating surpluses; the progressively 
reduced buying power of a unit of peasant produce has been seen as having 
been crucial in the initial mobilisation of the labour f o rce in colonial 
Zimbabwe. Mediation took place through the 'upward tendency in the e f f o r t 
price of Afr ican participation in the produce m a r k e t ' . ^ The labour f low in 
Zimbabwe is thus seen as having become a sel f -generat ive process as 
'people (got ) used to what they consume(d)'. To this Arrighi added that 
items not essential to satisfying subsistence requirements could 'with the 
mere passage of t ime, become necessities, whose consumption (was) 
32 indispensable'. 
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But attempting to delineate 'necessary' from 'discretionary' consumption 
would not tel l us very much about the changing dietary patterns which 
influenced the reproduction of labour power. In the formalist way Arrighi 
poses the problem, 'choice ' is made the essence of the economy, and the 
concrete culture of the economy in its market form is made a universal 
constant - 'the sel f -generat ive process'. The distinction between production 
and consumption is purely a marketing definition -with consumption 
being seen as the sole end and purpose, so that production is merely 
restricted to earning an income, and consumption, spending of that income. 
From a materialist or substantive view production and consumption are part 
of the same process. Marx's view was based on a complex conception of 
production. Certain aspects of distribution, exchange and consumption are 
properly part of production, what he calls " fac tors " or "moments" of 
production and these cannot be seen as determined by production. Within 
33 
the factors of production there is a narrowly defined mutual interaction. 
Then there are aspects of distribution, exchange and consumption which 
are not properly part of production, which lie outside it conceived in 
this wide sense, and which are determined by it in two ways. First, 
production determines the general form that distribution, exchange and 
consumption take; second production determines the relationships that 
each of them bears to one another and to production i tsel f , since the process 
always returns to production to begin again. They are all members of a 
total i ty, 'distinctions within a unity, in which aspects of distribution, 34 
exchange and consumption react back in a determined form upon production'. 
Thus as far as distribution relations are concerned, the distribution of 
people among the means of production is an aspect of the relations of 
production while the distribution of commodities between the same people 
is an aspect of distribution. Within exchange there is that which occurs 
between production units ( i .e. within the sphere of production) such 
that commodities can be made which are suitable for consumption, by the 
* final consumer (departments one and two respectively) . And finally within 
consumption itself there is the specif ic aspect in which the individual 
worker reappears within production as refreshed and energetic labour power, 
and there is the more general aspect in which individuals consume the 
entire mass of commodities as a result of their di f fer ing use values. 
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With such a framework, the whole subject of dietary changes cannot 
therefore be approached from the point of view of a transition from 
'discretionary' to necessary consumption^ and due account has to be taken 
that dietary changes involve actual social practice within particular 
material and cultural contexts, and are not merely a ref lex of the e f f ec ts 
of capital upon non-capitalist forms of production. The problem of the 
transition from non-capitalist forms of production in Zimbabwe is however 
too complex to be exhaustively dealt-with in the scope of This paper, and 
all that is proposed here is to make some tentative suggestions gleaned 
from theoretical and empirical work done by Chevalier in Peru on the 
concept of ' form of production' and the relationship between capitalist and 
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non-capitalist forms of production in peripheral social formations. 
Chevalier contends that the formal subsumption of labour under capital may 
occur in the absence of monetisation and in the absence of formal dis-
possession. In other words simple commodity producers producing 
subsistence goods for their own consumption on ' f ree ' land may be e f fec t ive ly 
separated from the surplus value they produce (that is ' formally ' exploited 
by capital). All that is required for this to occur is that such producers 
'maximise' the value of the ingredients used in production according to 
market calculations - and sometimes actually valorise them. In attempting to 
realise 'subsistence commodity values' (as distinct from 'non-commodified' 
use values) - by calculating the value of their own labour power and 
allocating it along lines indicated by its general valuation in the 
economy - the producers transfer the value of these non-monetised goods to 
other goods that are sold. Capitalists in the economy realise this value 
because the interaction between subsistence production and wage labour 
causes the undervaluation of both labour power and the goods produced by it. 
Chevalier describes the interaction between simple commodity production 
and wage labour as follows: Wage labour exists in the economy, but no 
household can subsist on local wages alone, because the continued existence 
of subsistence production leads to a market undervaluation of labour 
power. Subsistence producers (as a class) are willing to work for wages 
lower than their reproductive costs and therefore wage labour (as a class) 
must carry out some subsistence production in combination with wage work to re-
produce themselves: low wages, moreover lead subsistence producers to 
undervalue their own products, which they value in terms of the price of 
labour power needed to produce them (as established by the local market). 
Capital, therefore gets both cheap goods and cheap labour, both undervalued 
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by the local market. This results in the decentralisation of economic 
practices, but does not prevent capitalist relations of production from 
dominating the peripheral economy. 
Changes in diet are a consequence of the attempts by subsistence producers 
to 'maximise1 the value of the ingredients used in production. Those 
agriculturalists who (before the advent of capitalism) mainly produce 
food for their own households cease to produce the usual diverse 
array of products they had been accustomed to. They begin to produce 
a very f ew basic staples to obtain the most calories for the least e f f o r t . 
They minimise the expenditure of their labour power, Chevalier explains, 
because they have alternative uses for their labour power within the 
general economy. 
A t the preliminary level of analysis attempted in this paper, through the 
lack of empirical research, no attempt will be made to f i t what data is 
available into Chevalier 's framework - which has been posited merely to 
emphasise the point that the labour reserve paradigm is inadequate for 
explaining changes in diet or in understanding the consumer in the food 
production chain, as it divorces material practice from its cultural 
meaning - and to underpin the argument that changes in food habits are not 
simply a re f lect ion of material factors (d i f ferent forces of production) 
but instead stem from di f ferent material conditions (alternative uses of 
labour). 
1890s - 1930s : THE COMING OF THE COLONIAL 
FOOD PRODUCTION SYSTEM AND THE NEW DIET. 
In order to establish how changes in material conditions of production 
(alternative uses of labour) in Zimbabwe have influenced changes in food 
habits it is necessary to go back to the mid-nineteenth century in order 
to establish a base line for changing production patterns. 
In the mid-nioeeteenth century, there were basically four categories of 
food production: 
(a) domestic animals 
(b) hunting of wild game 
(c) crop cultivation 
(d) gathering from wild plants 
But it is important to bear in mind that, though there have been few parts 
of the land that could not support agriculture, Zimbabwe is not environmentally 
homogenous, and even in pre-colonial days, the population was not limited to 
a singular form of production and or use of natural resources. There have 
been substandard areas, where historically, losers in political struggles 
were consigned - such as the Inyanga part of the Eastern Highlands 
(good rainfall but poor soils), the crest of the watershed in the central 
plateau area ( fair rainfall and soils but exposed living and grazing areas 
and limited resources), the lower Zambezi Valley (inadequate rainfall), 
the Western sand and sodic - soil zone (poor soils). 
Though lying within the tropics, one f i f th of the terrain is over 1200 m 
above sea level and three f i f ths between Zambezi and Limpopo valleys 
experience tropical c l imate. The soils are predominantly sandy with the heavier 
loamy and clayey soils occurring in relatively 'small local areas (Natural 
Region V and I - see map I). The rainfall is unreliable, with seasonal 
rainfall occurring mainly between the months of November and March. Only 
37% of the country receives more than 700 mm annual average rainfall, 
considered necessary for semi-intensive farming, and less than a third of 
this area is actually arable. Average annual rainfall varies f rom below 
300 mm in low-lying areas of the country to over 1 000 mm on the central 
watershed. Generally, the topography, soils and cl imate of Zimbabwe are not 
favourable for intensive agricultural production. 
17 
More precisely, Zimbabwe has been classified into f i v e main 'agro-ecological ' 
or 'natural' regions wherein agricultural development is conditioned by a 
variety of dominant natural characteristics. A sixth Natural Region X 
refers to an area of 3,1 per cent of the country, totally unsuited for 
agriculture."^ 
Natural Region I : Specialised and Diversif ied Farming Region. 
Above 1 000 mm. rainfall per year with comparatively low temperatures, 
and favourable for forestry, fruit and intensive livestock production. 
Natural Region II : Intensive Farming Region. Rainfall is confined to 
summer and is moderately high (750 - 1 000 mm). The region is suitable for 
intensive systems of farming based on crops and/or livestock production. 
Natural Region III; Semi-Intensive Farming Region. This zone receives 
650 - 800 mm rain much of which arrives in infrequent heavy falls - and 
is marginal for crop production. 
Natural Region IV : Semi-Extensive Farming Region. The region is low in its 
receipt of rainfall. (450-650 mm) as is subject to periodic seasonal 
droughts and dry spells. The predominant use is thus livestock production. 
Natural Region V: Extensive Farming Region. This region is characterised by 
very low and erratic rainfall, making it unreliable even for the production of 
drought-resistant fodder and grain crops. It is largely characterised by 
extensive catt le ranching and game ranching. 
i 
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Going back to our attempt to characterise the categories of food pro-
duction in pre-colonial Zimbabwe - from a consideration of present day 
agro-ecological zones - cat t le rearing appears to have been an important 
act iv i ty . It was however limited to areas with pasture grasses for both wet and 
dry season use, or where during the dry season alternate long-distance grazing 
was available. 
The importance of catt le to pre-colonial societies in Zimbabwe is further 
underlined by the fac t that catt le payments had a "useful redistributive 
and wealth generating function in society where the reproductive abilities 
of women and cows were the only reinsurance against recurrent drought and 
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the limited storage l i f e of grain". In fac t the rise and fal l of the 
Great Zimbabwe State has been linked to the exploitation of transhumant 
type pasture land, achieving an ecological balance with tsetse f l y , and the 
degradation of nearby pastures rather than to long-distance trade and gold 
mining. For, the latter, and even in the Mutapa state depended to a large 
extent on the ability of rulers to provide food for those engaged in trades, of 39 
which meat on the hoof was the most easily transportable. The nineteenth 
century however saw a long-term decline in catt le as a result of the 
advancement of tsetse f l y , and in the 1860s/70s large herds were-decimated 
by the bovine pleuro - pneumonia epidemic. 
Wild game provided a dozen or so varieties, and hunting was not only 
an important social act iv i ty , but also a useful food supplement especially 
in times of drought. 
Crop cultivation was restricted in part by di f ferentials in soil fer t i l i ty 
the capacity of sandy soils to retain water and the heavier clays and 
alluvials to drain properly and above all the irregularity of rainfall. 
Crops were there fore careful ly selected with a view to their suitability 
for their soils and expected weather. The original food crops of the 
early Iron A g e - i.e. various millets and sorghums were still the staple 
food during much of the nineteenth century. Although maize was 
available from as far back as the sixteenth century, and had spread widely, 
by the 1890s it had yet to become the staple crop, being largely used as a 
41 relish in its cob form to back up the millet porridge. 
Without conjuring up scenarios of pre-colonial Zimbabwe having been repre-
sentative of 'merrie ' A f r i ca , it can nevertheless be said that there existed 
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a dietet ic balance which was to be upset by colonialism in ways we shall 
detail below. Various social and human controls were geared towards the 
maintenance of this balance. With respect to domestic stock raising, the 
seniority system by which senior adult males jointly managed herding, the 
maintenance of herd levels on given pastures the system of inheritance and 
limited access by younger males to catt le controlling e l i te , prevented 
the overstocking and overgrazing of land at the expense of future 
generations. And pastures near settlements were protected by long-
distance herding by adult males. 
'Traditionally' also the distribution of the produce was divided (though not 
equally) among all members of cattle-owning settlements. Catt le herds 
supplemented the daily diet through milk products; smaller stock and 
fowl were produced for more regular domestic meat, and the meat take-o f f 
of the cat t le herds were used primarily in crisis situations, most frequently 
when drought brought hunger and threatened the harvest. 
The keys to 'traditional' controls over wi ldl i fe lay in policies of group 
hunting and the development of special medicines, known only to the 
community doctor. 
Cultivable soils were also a resource limited in quantity and easily 
overused. Local clans and chiefs therefore careful ly cor+rol led culti-
vation in their areas. Additional emigrants could be accommodated only by 
submitting to local controls and in most instances received the marginal lands. 
Though empirical data is hard to c i te on this it can be assumed that in the 
extensive system of agriculture in practice, a necessary ratio existed 
between land cultivated and land l e f t uncultivated, in order to ensure the 
maintenance of fer t i l i ty of the soil and reproduction of the productive 
system at the same level of e f f i c i ency . 
However it should again be stressed that in this almost ' ideal ' situation we 
have described, there existed many inequalities with regard to access 
to f e r t i l e soils, and the very fac t that both wives and catt le , the so-
called traditional means of production, were less available to the lower 
strata of the population. 
Though the system we have outlined above suffered some severe shocks during 
the series of droughts in the 1860s and 1870s and the bovine pleuro pneumonia 
epidemic, the final blow was delivered by the advent of settler colonialism. 
21 
The 1890s saw the widespread seizure of Afr ican catt le , a f ter the m 
Anglo-Ndebele war in 1893, and in Mashonaland in lieu of cash for the 
hut tax. The spread of the rinderpest from 1896 during which it is 
estimated that there was a 95 per cent death rate exarcebated by the 
if. 2 
destabilisation brought by white settler colonialism. To this 
was added widespread alienation of land af ter the Chimurenga War of 1896/7 
enforcing a change in settlement patterns mainly from areas where culti-
vation had been intense to dry sandy soils, where a reduced variety of 
crops could be grown. 
In some areas as a result of the early forced labour policies, and later 
hut and poll taxes males were involved in labouring outside the domestic unit 
further undermining the ability of many households to provide for themselves. 
The f irst recognisable response from the patchy historical data available, 
in that the years 1898 - 1914 saw an attempt by many peasants to rebuild 
their stocks decimated during the rinderpest epidemic of 1896. Thus in the 
years a f ter 1898 the rate of increase in Afr ican stockholding has been 
estimated at some twe lve to f i f t een per cent annually, despite diseases, 
43 slaughtering for food and sales. 
Thus it would appear that the increase in stockholding was an attempt by 
Afr ican producers to realise 'subsistence' commodity values, by calculating 
the value of their own labour power, and allocating it along lines 
indicated by its general valuation in the new economy, and at the same time 
resisting proletarianisation. The increase in stockholding was complemented 
by an increase in cultivated acreage, and the increased use of ploughs -
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for the production of food crops for sale. Further land alienation, 
even before the monumental Land Apportionment Ac t of 1930, deepened the 
crisis faced by Afr ican producers, forced into a transition from a balanced 
system of extensive agriculture to an intensive one: the ratio between land 
l e f t cultivated and uncultivated was upset, and no matter how much they 
increased acreage ploughed, a vicious circle was set, wherein when yields 
fe l l , cultivated areas expanded and when cultivated areas expanded yields 
fe l l : a pattern to be reproduced through the next decades. The functioning 
of the 'new' system was thus incompatible with certain rates of population 
growth or with the necessity of extending cultivated areas; by the late 1920s 
it has been estimated that population in the reserves was already f i ve times 
greater than its carrying capacity. 
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The e f f e c t of the succession of droughts from the years 1912/1916 - known in 
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oral traditions as the Bhuza famine (Nzara ya Bhuza), illustrate 
further the destabilising e f f e c t s of colonial rule. In 1912, the e f f e c t s of 
the drought were slightly alleviated because of the relatively good 
price for catt le , enabling most Afr ican producers to exchange catt le 
for grain, but by 1916 when the price of cat t le plummetted many peasants 
had to rely for subsistence on ' food aid' in the form of munga and millet 47 
from the Native Department. The longstanding 'tradition' of 
relying on exchange of livestock to insure against drought, which 
had been redeployed a f ter colonialism to resist proletarianisation was 
thus progressively becoming inoperative. A contemporary observer drew 
the fol lowing lessons from the famine for the local white agricultural 
community: 
"Several farmers also have Seized this opportunity and have 
traded grain for catt le and those in a position to do this have 
profited from the drought. The def ic iency of crops has also 
had the e f f e c t of inducing the natives to turn out to work on 
the farms, and thereby they benefit not only the farmers, who 
get labour, but also the country by retaining in it the waggs which 
otherwise go to aliens, who take their savings elsewhere". 
The progressive undervaluation of labour-power of the Afr ican producer, in 
the emerging market economy manifested with such starkness in times of 
drought, was closely tied to and conditioned by the formation of price through 
credit, research and extension policies a f ter 1908,. by the state, which were 
meant to promote white settler capitalist agriculture. Until 1910, commercial 
agricultural production in Zimbabwe was based mainly on the monoculture 
of maize - and there was indeed l i tt le till then by way of technology to 
distinguish it from the peasant's product : land was f irst worked by hoe 
and seed broadcast. The f irst significant increases in maize yields 
came from the replacement of f l int maize seed by imported maized seed. 
In 1915 maize accounted for over 92% of commercial land cultivated, which 
declined to 80% by 1921.49 
And while in 1911, the agricultural industry employed only 16% of the 
total labour force, it employed 40% by 1921 and 50% by 1927.50 
But even by 1930, most white farmers were not sel f -suf f ic ient in maize, 
and the greatest part of them were entirely reliant on Afr ican producers 
for rations for their labourers."^ 
By the mid-1920s important and far-reaching dietary changes were a foot 
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in Afr ican society. Maize, which had been grown occasionally for 
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home consumption, was becoming both a staple food and a cash crop. 
There were several reasons for this: f irstly there was the matter 
of palatability of sadza from ground maize flour given the restricted variety 
of relish then available: sadza from zviyo/mhunga (mil let e tc ) needed 
d i f ferent types of relish to be palatable - - such as the d i f ferent 
types of meat that could be obtained through hunting before colonisation, 
whereas sadza from maize could be swallowed with less relish or with salt 53 
or without any relish. These with the increase in grinding mills, maize 
meal was becoming more available by then. Grinding mills were a great 
advance on the existing technologies for grinding maize. Whereas mhunga arid 
rapoko could just be stamped in a mortar, cleaned and then ground into 
meal - the process was more complicated for maize. It could not be 
ground into meal on stones, but the kernels were f irst sprinkled with 
water, and while wet , were stamped in a wooden mortar to remove the bran 
covering. This bran was then winnowed out and the starchy grains were 
put in large pots of water and l e f t to soak for three or four days, which 
caused the starch cells to swell and break apart. The soaked grain 
was then dipped into large baskets, which were put on top of stones, so that 
the water could drain o f f overnight. And finally, the grain was put back 
into a stamping mortar and pounded up into a f ine meal - and the white 
f lour-l ike meal was winnowed as it was removed from the stamping blocks 
and spread to dry in the sun."^ 
The shift to maize, more fundamentally, however, was influenced by the 
changes from extensive to intensive cultivation, and the changes in the 
division of labour for agricultural tasks e f f e c t ed by the migrant labour 
system, which enforced the absence of men. Recent research revising 
earlier anthropological studies has thrown more light on our understanding 
of the division of labour by sex and its e f f e c t s on agricultural production. 
Baumann's seminal work of 1928, on the relationship between the sexual 
division of labour and farming techniques, suggested that hoe cultivation 
of vegetable foods, by women working individually, using methods which 
were very of ten superficial and without peak periods of labour input, 
constituted the earliest stage in the evolution of agricultural technique 
and social organisation. He further claimed that root crops and female 
labour were associated. And that grain crops, which required increased 
male labour, were a late development in A f r i ca . 
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But Guyer has shown that the root/cereal crop labour organisation d i f fers 
at least as much within these two categories as it does between t h e m . ^ 
And more pertinently for our study, she shows that d i f ferences in growing 
conditions and in labour organisation between maize and sorghum and 
millets (zv iyo, rapoko etc . ) are radical and invalidate any generalisations about 
grain crops as undifferentiated. While millet, and sorghum are characterised 
by the complexity of task specialisation and complementarity, peak period 
labour mobilisation and involved ritual act iv i ty, maize is not. Maize is 
characterised by individual and female labour, in contrast with other cereal 
staples - in other words the organisation of work is task speci f ic for millets 
and sorghum, but crop speci f ic for maize. 
In millet production, for instance, Richards showed that tree pollarding 
was carried out by groups of young men, the stacking of branches by the 
women, firing of the f ie ld by the men, planting generally by men, with 
their wives covering up the seed. Men fenced the fields, women did any 
necessary crop-tending and reaping was an exclusively f emale task. Ritual 
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act iv i ty was centred on tree - cutting in new - millet gardens. 
Unlike millet, maize could be grown on individual farms, generally by women, 
with no set standards of labour mobilisation. Female labour predominated 
at all stages of cultivation, but men could work their own fields, and 
every member of the family til led, harvested and stored the produce from 
his or her own plot. So that: "Symbolically as well as practically, the 
59 shift to maize was a shift in gender speci f ic i ty" . 
Kuper has suggested that for Southern A f r i ca , the old staple of sorghum 
is now used for beer, associated with men and threshed outside the 
homestead symbolically in the public sphere, whereas maize, the new staple 
is "used for porridge associated with women, and entirely processed within 
the symbolic confines of the domestic sphe re " . ^ 
But the fundamental problematic remains how such changes Were brought about. 
The l i t t le evidence available in Zimbabwe shows that the main contribution 
maize made to the mitigation of labour peaks lay in the somewhat shorter 
growing season and the reduced need for scaring away birds and the e f f e c t s 
of labour migration; as a 1942 study noted the widespread shift from millet 
to mealie meal was a result of the "labour-saving e f f e c t of buying meal", 
and that: 
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"The change has been necessitated by the absence of m^p at 
work, throwing added economic burdens on the women". 
What is important to stress with respect to these shifts in food habits is 
that it is not the crops themselves which have determined domestic labour 
allocation and cultural allocation but historical processes unleashed 
by the forced transition from non-capitalist to capitalist relations of 
production having generality from one region to another. 
In considering the changes in food habits up to about the 1930s it is 
also necessary to explain the decline of animal proteins, primarily beef 
in the diets of Zimbabweans. Roberts has noted that discussion on this 
issue has been marked by emphasis on 'ritual aspects' neglecting the 
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material explanations. Thus there developed a 'European complex about 
Afr ican catt le ' , attributing the noted reluctance either to sell cat t le 
or kill them for consumption not to prevailing marketing conditions but 63 rather to psychological or cultural reasons. With the increasing 
restricted access to land, however, catt le prices were of ten higher than 
wages on the mines and factories, and thus provided a way out of wage 
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labour. But of course the 'catt le complex' persisted. It was typif ied 
in' the writings on the 'food crisis' of a renowned Rhodesian anthropologist, 
and Chief Nat ive Commissioner, writing in 1950: 
"In the present state of world food supplies and especially of 
the shortage of butcher's meat which is our chief source of 
proteins, the religious and social significance attached to 
catt le by the Bantu tribes (dimigishing as it may be) is yet a 
matter of material importance". 
Pari passu with the development of new food habits by 1930, signified by 
the shift f rom sorghum and millets to maize meal, and the decline 
in meat consumption, there also emerged in these years the 'compound diet ' 
on the mines - geared to the subsistence needs of the single migrant 
worker. 
The quality of this 'institutional diet ' , which in the early years of this 
century was reported to be inferior even to the prison diet - is perhaps 
best indicated by the outbreaks of scurvy on mine compounds. Between 
1906 and 1908 over 4 000 black miners died in compounds from various 
diseases. Of these 8,3% in 1906, 12,7% in 1907 and 13,5 per cent in 
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1908 were attributed to scurvy. For many of the mineworkers, the sole diet 
was mealie meal f i v e days in the w e e k . ^ Food, like housing, was a 
target for cost-conscious employers, - and as it was expensive for much 
of the early decades of the colonial period mining companies supplied their 
labour f o rce with the cheapest possible diet. These were many cases where 
the only ration was maize meal and salt, forcing^many workers to spend a large 
proportion of their wages on purchases of extra food, especially tinned m e a t . ^ 
Many mineworkers resorted to hunting and gathering of wild vegetables in areas 
near the mine compounds. 
In 1908, the standard diet for mineworkers which was to persist for 
decades to come was instituted. It constituted the fol lowing: 2^ lbs of 
meal, ^oz of salt, 11b meat per week 2 lbs of vegetables per week 
68 and 8 ounces of lard. 
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DEFUNCT LABOUR RESERVES' AND THE MATERIAL ORIGINS OF 
HUNGER 1930 - 19 
The period 1930 - 45, in Zimbabwean social and economic history, is perhaps 
the least researched into. And yet in terms of attempting to understand 
Zimbabwe's hunger problem whether in terms of the present ' low productivity' 
of peasant farmers or in terms of food availabil ity, it provides a 
useful benchmark. 
i 
And even in terms of theorising about the political economy of Zimbabwe, 
developments before 1930 are in a teleoiogical fashion held up as a mirror 
of things to come. 
This state of a f fa i rs is perhaps best represented by conventional 'radical' 
analyses of Zimbabwe which take as their point of departure the labour 
reserve hypothesis. While these studies go to great pains and detail to 
establish the administrative rationale behind the creation of the 
reserves in Southern A f r i ca they explain l i t t le else. 
It has now been established that administrative measures up to 1930 
aimed at circular migration, the ideal being that only single male workers 
would migrate to urban centres; they were expected to return later in 
l i f e or at times of unemployment;, and that the system was rationalised as 
ideologically necessary to protect whites and to keep rural societies 
intact. But social scientists in Southern A f r i ca seem to have been 
unable to distinguish between intent and actual historical processes and have 
internalised the administrative logic and integrated it into some romantic 
anti-capitalist f ramework, the whole issue of food policy in independent 
Southern A f r i ca is now being seen in terms of reversing the trend towards 
more urbanisation because it is argued that rural-urban migration 
provides cheap labour of benefit to an export - oriented enclave economy, 
limiting the role of rural areas to the reproduction of labour and thus 
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confl ict ing with the role of rural people as commodity producers. 
It is argued that up to 1930, the loss of cat t le at the turn of the 
century led to self - generating male underemployment and reduction in 
household food supplies. 
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"Where this occurred the creation of male migrant labour entrenched 
what may have been only a temporary phenomenon. In addition to 
the decline in consumption goods from animal husbandry, there 
was also the loss of adult male labour, including in some areas 
even male child labour. This naturally a f f e c t ed not only the 
care and feeding of animals but also foodstuff production, if 
we recognise that male agricultural act ivit ies had hardly been 
non-existent, as colonial authorities so of ten claimed. Thus as 
males l e f t their vil lages more frequently and for longer periods 
the heavy proportion of tasks associated with the production of 
agricultural goods - o f ten cash crops that needed to be sold 
in order to buy consumption goods as in the case of cotton 
cu l t i va t i on in Northern Mozambique - fe l l on the shoulders of 
women..." 
And that by 1930, both mining capitalists and settler agriculturalists 
were able to claim the success of their policies, despite the fac t that 
then and even f i v e decades later there was no complete proletarianisation 
in the sense of the creation of a 'labour force dependent on its reproduction 
solely upon the wage mechanism'. But Wallerstein et . al. do not seek the 
causal factors for this in the object ive social and economic processes 
but rather o f f e r this explanation: 
"This was quite explicitly ruled out by both colonial and 
capitalist agencies, for it was well recognised that full 
proletarianisation would require higher levels of wage payments". 
Besides the overconcentration on the almost subjective determinants of labour 
supply, not only is the resistance to proletarianisation ignored but also 
the growth of the economy is assumed to have been unidirectional, 
without any crisis periods, when there was actually no demand for labour, 
as happened during the Great Depression a f ter 1930. 
The period of the Great Depression, was marked in Zimbabwe, by a 
devastating combination of crop failures, the collapse of markets and 
of prices for crops, and a collapse in the demand for labour, and 
unemployment. And surely, this must have some impact on the society and 
economy of the reserves, qualitatively and quantitatively d i f ferent from 
what had taken place before 1930. And it must have led to changes in 
agricultural practices, and food habits. 
\ 
By internalising the logic of the administrative labour reserve, the 
'labour reserve school' finds itself in a similar dilemma as that faced 
by the administrators, which one observer described in the fol lowing terms: 
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"The relationship of the natives to the demands of the 
European economy has been similar throughout Southern 
A f r i ca . Their comparatively large numbers persuaded the 
Europeans to think that here was a fund of cheap labour. 
Two factors - the inferior status presumed as being inherent 
in them, and their large numbers - determined the future 
place of the natives in all spheres of economic development. 
Two factors worked against this continuation of abundance: 
the indisposition of the Afr ican to identi fy himself with 
the new way of living and the attitude of the European 
toward the native's inferior status which kept the Native 's 
wage to a minimum. In the presence of a large^£Jative 
population, there emerged a 'shortage of labour'". 
Because of an overemphasis on the supply determinants it is there fore 
not surprising that the problematic has resurfaced, in recent attempts 
to prescribe solutions to Southern Afr ica 's food security problems. The 
only d i f f e rence now is that the coming of black rule which in the so-called 
'labour reserve economies', has meant either the end or the relaxation of 
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urban influx controls, - and that is now posed as the 'crisis' and there is 
now talk of the 'defunct labour reserves' in Zambia now causing problems for 
73 peasants' nutrition as a result of their ' latent urban orientation, or 
74 in the case of Zimbabwe for the transition to socialism'. 
The other 'sel f-generating' mechanism of ten cited the 'labour-reserve 
school' to explain the peculiar nature of proletarianisation in Southern 
A f r i ca is that of land alienation. By failing to relate land alienation 
to actual material conditions, such analyses obscufate the real issues 
pertaining to the creation of a proletariat: that the formation of a 
proletariat should be treated independently of the question of the possession 
of land (absolutely) - as the process of di f ferent iat ion which is identif ied 
as the mechanism creating this proletariat is not one which involves 
individual labourers. The subjects of capitalist di f ferentiat ion are 
peasant households not individual peasants. The formation of a proletariat 
is there fore related not to dispossession but to the economic act iv i ty of 
household units. And the fac t that in countries like Zimbabwe, this 
economic act iv i ty , has not been intersectoral, but rather spatial (and 
sometimes temporal) - does not reveal any peculiar logic about capitalism 
in Southern A f r i ca not creating a ' ful l ' proletariat. Land alienation 
should therefore incorporate more materialist concerns than the so-called 
'straddling phenomenon', which are best likely to explain the so-called 
population problem of the communal areas and their low productivity. There 
is a need to understand particularly in the period 1930 - 1945 - the 
reinforcement of the now familiar vicious circle - of fall ing yields in spite of 
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expanded/intensive cultivation. And how land alienation created 
contradictions between production and consumption, means and needs. 
The crucial point that Zimbabwe's contemporary food problem can be traced 
to the period 1930 - 45 has of ten been missed because of certain underlying 
misconceived assumptions concerning the relationship between production 
and consumption, and their interface with the wider political economy. 
The f irst is the crude evolutionist tendency which associates 'peasants' 
or 'communal producers' in post-1980 parlance with direct consumption and 
' farmer ' with commercialisation - thus stamping the character of se l f -
suff ic iency upon individuals committed to household production, only 
because they have historically tried to resist proletarianisation and 
not because they have been in any sense 'non-monetised' and averse to 
money-mediated forms of consumption. The second is what has been termed 
'a mischievous attitude to Afr ican agriculture' - in the way crops are 
determined to be either cash or food crops; thus the term 'commercial ' 
agriculture has come to have two definitions - one for the Europeans, 
no matter what they produced. Afr icans only became commercial when they 
produced for the 'market ' - that is c o f f e e , cotton, rubber e tc and as 
a result: 
"An Afr ican smallholder whose object ive function is not defined in 
terms of British pounds sterling or American dollars is irrational 
and must £>e regarded as someone operating outside a money 
economy". 
To understand what happened to Zimbabwean agricultural production in the 
1930s, it is necessary to establish the class origin of the output of 
each agricultural commodity; the ideal criterion to use in determining 
this would be the proportion of this output coming from groups of 
farms arranged according to their use of hired labour power. But it has 
not been possible to obtain these types of data. A second best would be 
data on the proportion of hired labour used in the production of each 
crop. ^ But even this exercise has not been possible within the t ime 
constraints of preparing this paper, so I have had to rely on impressions. 
> 
Thus up to 1930, tobacco and cotton in Zimbabwe appears to have been 
more of 'capitalist ' crops than maize, though it is estimated that in 
1921 tobacco occupied 3,28% of the area planted to white commercial 
farms compared to 80% for maize. And in the 1926 - 7 growing 
season when 'as a result of agricultural speculation ... pressure on 
available labour supplies gathered momentum', it is significant that 
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the two crops directly responsible for this trend, cotton and tobacco 
required more labourers per acre than the traditional staple of white 
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settler farmers, maize. The number of European farmers increased 
rapidly from 2 403 in the 1923/24 season to 2 912 in 1927/28, and the 
acreage cultivated per farmer from 119 to 134 during the same period. A 
switch to labour intensive crops like cotton which required 'roughly two, 
three times as much labour than an equivalent area of maize, and to 
tobacco where the corresponding factor was 10 imposed further pressure 
on suppl ies.^ 
Though one could say that 'maize! was the least capitalist crop, therein 
lies its importance for understanding how the settler political economy 
underpinned the relationship between production and consumption. In the 
colonial Zimbabwe of the 1930s it had become an example of a commodity 
that was a necessity for an economic class for both sale and food consump-
tion - in the years 1928 - 1930, Afr ican sales of maize were about 15 per cent 
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of total sales - due to the bad harvests of the previous year. For the 
1933 - 5 period, between 50 and 75 per cent of all peasant produced maize 
marketed was retained by traders for selling back to peasants in the 
dry season, or was sold to catt le ranches, tobacco growers, and other 81 
indirect consumers such as mines. Thus while a 'necessity' for the 
workers and peasants in a sense, it was a relat ive luxury for the settlers -
i.e. it was used for indirect feeds for the beef industry and for rations 
for labour by mineowners, by tobacco farmers and by the white working class 
for whom the domestic workers' rations (of which maize meal was a 
predominant portion) in a sense consituted an important part of its wage 
foods, and was always taken into account in the calculation of the white 
consumer price index. The fac t that the markets for maize and feed were 
linked were therefore to present a multitude of problems with respect to 
pricing - especially in the Depression years. 
The Depression was marked by the collapse of the prices of agricultural 
products - f irst for cotton, then for tobacco and finally for maize -
a "cumulation of events that brought farmers to the brink of ruin; 
a f ter the collapse of the cotton boom in the late 1920s growers of cotton 
turned to maize; simultaneously the tobacco boom of the mid to late 
1920s forced up labour costs, which settler maize growers had to try to 
meet; and when the tobacco boom collapsed, previous tobacco growers were 
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also found to 'switch to maize ' ". 
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What could be described as a 'maize trap' came into operation for both 
white farmers and Afr ican producers; thus for the large white farmer 
engaged in the production of maize for export, the price dropped from 
a plateau of 11 shillings a bag to 5 shillings in 1930 and to a low of 
3 shillings and four pence in April 1931, - at the very t ime when the 
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surplus for export was accumulating. There were di f f icult ies in finding 
alternatives for maize as a cash crop not only for the settlers but 
also for the Afr ican producers. The settler was too preoccupied with 
short-term survival to diversify out of maize, and for the very large 
producers ranching was beyond their means because of the outbreak of 
foot-and-mouth disease and the prohibitive costs of building up a herd - and 
they could not diversi fy to cotton because the maize lands were then 84 
unsuitable for tobacco, whose market had in any case collapsed. The 
Afr ican producer had no alternative between maize and selling his labour 
power at a t ime when employment was unavailable, and even where it was, 
at below subsistence levels. 
At first the settler government attempted to protect white producers by 
instituting an art i f ic ial ly controlled domestic price, pitched high 
enough to compensate for the low export prices which could at least 
have helped them to meet their costs of production, by compulsorily 
pooling all maize through a board of control (comprising representatives 
of all the interests involved: maize growers, the railways, mines, commerce 
and the millers) which would establish a uniform local sale price which 
would distribute the burden equally amongst producers. But when the 
scheme was implemented it was vehemently opposed by beef producers, 
the mining industry, small maize farmers and the employees of domestic 
labour. 
Catt le and mining interests, as large indirect consumers of maize, were 
concerned at the prospect that uniform pricing would deprive them of the 
right to buy cheaper maize from Afr ican producers. The small maize farmer 
objected to having to subsidise the larger maize producers, and the 
85 white consumer objected to paying more for his workers' rations. 
Some compromise was therefore hammered out in the 1931 Maize Ac t 
to prevent 'non-maize' growers from being penalised by exempting certain 
regions specialising in ranching for instance (e.g. Matabeleland). But 
it was found that farmers in non-controlled areas (growing maize in addition 
to catt le ranching) were able to sell maize to controlled areas, and 
were also able to buy it cheaper from Afr ican producers. 
Though theoretically under the Maize Control Ac t of 1931, Afr ican maize 
producers were entitled to the same general 'pool' for maize delivered 
directly to the Central Board Depots in practice very l i t t le maize could 
be delivered direct because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the 
reserves - they therefore had to sell their maize either to traders in 
the reserves or to the nearest white farmers and most likely buy it 
back in the form of maize meal. 
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The Ac t stipulated that Afr icans could not in controlled areas sell directly 
to the white farmers - but had to sell to the trader - producers. Traders 
were given a monopoly in such areas, and accordingly took advantage to 
pay ultra-low prices. Afr icans in some areas found it increasingly di f f icult 
to find cash for their tax commitments and for food purchases. The 
situation was graphically summed up in a telegram from the Native 
Commissioner Mazoe to the Chief Native Commissioner in 3uly 1931: 
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"Consider immediate and urgent representations should be made 
regarding e f f e c t s ( o f ) maize control regulations in reserve. 
Natives complain with every case (sic) that they are unable 
( to) sell grain for cash and cannot obtain money for their tax. 
Traders in reserve now in position of monopolists, and can dictate 
not only price, but medium with which to buy grain which 'medium 
is trade goods only. I anticipate di f f iculty in collecting 
native revenue this year. In past years private consumers bought 
grain in reserve for cash, incidentallyggontrolling to some 
extent the prices o f f e red by traders". 
Paying Afr ican producers below the export price for maize provided no 
solution to the problems faced by settler producers. The 1931 Ac t was there-
fore replaced by the 1934 Ac t which extended control to the whole 
country, by instituting a uniform price but for the purposes of 
controlling 'the price to the native' to prevent it f rom being art i f ic ial ly 
high, incorporated a dual marketing system: a local pool, reserved for 
whites and comprising the distributable revenue earned from local maize 
sales, and an export pool comprising revenue earned from exports, such export 
revenue being supposedly for distribution to Afr ican producers, but being 
paid out to white settler maize growers and trader producers who handled 
Afr ican maize; nor did the bulk of Afr ican producers participate in its 
distributions. Rather as Keyter has pointed out, the whole pooling system 
provided a mechanism whereby the state won over the tobacco growers and 
catt le ranchers (by providing cheap feed for them) by ensuring them cheap 
supplies of peasant produced maize, and by which it could run up cash 
surpluses to subsidise the higher maize prices paid to white growers from 
\ 
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the local pool. 
Thus Afr ican maize supplies were intricately linked to the needs of the 
state to subsidise not only white commercial producers of maize but also to 
subsidise the indirect consumers who required cheap maize to minimise 
labour costs, and feed costs for l ivestock. 
The 1934 Ac t , as far as the ability of peasant producers to meet their 
monetary obligations and consumption needs, worsened the situation. The 
N.C. Mutare wrote in 1934: 
"... the main cause of the delayed collection of the tax was 
the extension of the Maize Control Ac t to this district ... The 
older natives had been accustomed to dispose of a f ew bags of 
maize at 7/6d to 8/- a bag. A f t e r deducting the price of the 
sack and the cost of transport, they could get a net price of 
about 5/- a bag and the sale of four bags meant their £1 tax. 
With the price at 4/- had to sell f rom 8 to 12 bags to 
obtain the same money". 
By 1937, in densely populated areas such as Mazoe, were reported to have 
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recorded almost a 100% increase in the area under maize. In 1938, the 
Chief Nat ive Commissioner was complaining that ' f rom one cause or another 
the production of maize in central districts appears to be increasing 
and there is no doubt that continuous maize crops rob the soil' and by 1939 
he was noting that 'maize control ... does not stimulate production only 
in such areas and in such rotations as will least do no harm to the land. 
Also noted for the late 1930s was a steep increase in the total estimated 
Afr ican maize production and in the rising ratio of Afr ican sales to 
production. Afr icans were estimated to have sold between 23,5 per cent and 
27,1 per cent of their total production in the three years leading up to 
the 1931 Ac t and between 20,4 per cent and 30,7 per cent in the four years 
leading up to the 1934 Ac t . 1937 - 8 saw the total production rise to a 
million bags, and sales to 43,4 per cent of that production - or double 
the amount previously sold. By 1938 - 9, the ratio was up to an even 90 
striking 54,4 per cent with sales almost treble the pre-controi levels. 
While the increase in output of maize barely kept pace with the population 
growth of the reserves, an explanation also has to be found for the sources 
of labour that made the increase possible, both in the long term and in 
the short term. The Depression had most likely meant the return of many 
\ 
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male workers to the reserves, and the ability of agricultural production 
was undermined by resett lement under the Land Apportionment Ac t . Thus 
Chiweshe reserve, it was observed that there was marked ecological 
imbalance in agriculture in 1939. This was not due largely to 
natural population increase - but rather in the short term at least due 
to the forced resettlement within the reserve of Afr icans from neighbouring 
Crown Lands. Thus cultivated acreage was further extended, pressure 
imposed on the grazing lands - setting up a vicious c irc le which could 
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only be broken by the removal of excess population. 
While, in the short run forced resettlement and the return of workers, 
might have increased the population of the reserves - there are more 
long-term structural reasons responsible for the growth of population. 
Research has yet to be done on whether there were any drastic changes in 
the size of the family during the f irst thirty years of this century, and 
if there were, to what extent, they can be related to economic processes. 
Research done in Ecuador shows that for the peasants there, children 
are defined as crucial for subsistence. That children represent the 
possibility for diversif ication of monetary income in the future as well as 
security when the parents ret ire from act ive work. Peasants then 
have therefore been seen to exploit d i f ferent 'economic niches' and this 
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'polyvalent' strategy was only possible when the family expanded. It is 
most likely that given the socio-economic crisis faced by Zimbabwean 
peasants, a comparable situation developed. 
The outbreak of war in 1939 created a demand for labour. A Compulsory 
Nat ive Labour Ac t was passed in 1942. And as many as 11 000 labourers 
were conscripted for three-month periods to work on farms to meet the 
world shortage of agricultural produce or building airf ields for the 
Royal A i r f o rce Training Scheme. The demand for labour was so great 
that a significant number of women began to enter the labour market, 
primarily as domestic labour. 
Frederic Cooper has observed about the whole Afr ican continent: 
"The years between 1935 and 1950 were the t i m e ^ f the greatest 
urban turmoil A f r i ca has known, before or since". 
This was borne out in Zimbabwe too, for as with peasant production the 
period when migrant labourers came forth, did enoughv work and did not 
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create trouble had been brief. And big yawning cracks were beginning 
to appear in the system where migrant workers were supposed to deliver 
themselves, do enough work and return to their vil lages. The system had 
worked best during the Depression when cheapness was more important than 
output. 
The war also introduced spiralling inflation. While a small portion of 
Afr ican workers received a cost of living allowance most did not. 
Inflation hit the Afr ican harder than the European. And in addition to 
inflation near famine conditions existed in 1942. The drought had in fac t 
been the worst over a decade. ^ Maize rations were reduced by 25 per cent 
in early February 1942. Within days, Afr ican workers at the vital war 
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industry asbestos mine at Shabani struck. The frequency of strikes was 
to increase during the next decade. 
Serious soul-searching on how to cope with the new situation, and 
characteristically it was not seen as a clash between labour and capital 
but rather as a clash of cultures. And the whole issue of the workers' 
diet assumed a prominence it had not done in previous years. One such 
expert commenting on dietary changes observed in 1942. 
"If we wish to change food habits in the Nat ive we must be 
prepared to change related modes of production, distribution, 
storage preparation, housewifery and consumption as well 
as tastes and social values". 
How this was attempted forms the subject matter for the next chapter, 
which attempts to give an overview of changing food habits, under the 
aegis of industrialisation in colonial Zimbabwe from 1945 to 1965. 
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IMPROVING 'HUMAN CAPITAL' FOR PERIPHERAL 
INDUSTRIALISATION 1 9 - 1965 
A f t e r the Second World War, the then colony of Southern Rhodesia was 
caught up in the general euphoria pervading the British Empire 
concerning the benefits industrialisation would bring about to the lives 
of its inhabitants. The London Times spelt out some of the social 
implications of this replication of this expected industrial revolution: 
"Formerly, the low productivity of Afr ican labour was tolerated 
because it was cheap and abundant. ... Natural idleness was 
checked by physical compulsion. Now development reaches a point 
where it cannot progress without greater individual e f f o r t . ... 
Most Europeans have for centuries embraced a religious code which 
condemned idleness as Wicked; his cults and taboos have more 
frequently taught the Afr ican that work is degrading or evil . His 
universal attachment to the land removes the threat of want ... if 
he is prepared to l ive at a low level of subsistence. Simplicity 
of needs, together with the shortage of consumer goods, robs money 
wages of their values ... Nobody can deny the ugly aspects of 
mass unemployment of natives in plantations, industry and mines". 
However the Afr ican population of 160 millions 'by greater e f f o r t ... 
can produce surpluses which will raise its own standards and 
Minister to the need of others (emphasis added) ... The problem 
therefore is how to improve the output of the individual native ... 
First and foremost he must be made physically f i t ter ... by means 
of improved diet ... It involves also improved health services ... 
Provision of consumer goods as incentives to labour is important ...". 
Much soul-searching also went on in Southern Rhodesia, as the o f f i c ia l 
doctrine of segregation was abandoned in favour of partnership - as it 
was argued that a system of segregation made with respect to consumer 
goods a naturally inelastic demand even more inelastic. And a leading 
economist advised: 
"... The economic circumstances in which the object ives of 
settler supremacy can most easily be pursed no longer prevail. 
Adjustments in the method of economic expansion or in the social 
structure itself may thus be required if the growth of the money 
economy is to be sustained". 
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The Second World War was important for the profound structural shifts it 
brought about in the economy, and society for the two decades a f ter 1945. 
Shortages of consumer goods during the war had brought about some import 
substitution. Throughout the war years, and post-war period all sectors 
of industry grew in real terms i.e. faster than- the rate of inflation. 
Between 1945 and 1957, the value of manufacturing output rose steadily 
until it was challenging agriculture. And in what has been referred to as the 
second wave of colonisation, the number of settlers increased from 82 386 in 
1946 to 135 596 in 1 9 5 1 . " 
But by 1957, the pace had slowed down, and by 1963 Afr ican employment was 
growing in the whole economy by only 1,1 per cent per year, and in manu-
facturing by only 0,9 per cent - and in fact , during the last three years of 
Federation i.e. 1960 - 1963, Africans in Southern Rhodesia lost nearly a third of 
the jobs created since 1954; and between the years 1960 - 65, A f r i ca r 
employment actually declined. 
What had happened to the engine of growth? Explanations have ranged from 
the ' insuff iciency' of demand, to the lack of confidence in the late years 
of the decade because of political uncertainty, but by far the most 
plausible explanation is that given by Ramsay who argued that f rom the last 
half of the 1950s, the manufacturing sector had moved into a position of 
excess capacity. And that variations in the capital/labour ratio rather 
than ref lect ing changes in the production function, signified instead shifts 
in the levels of capacity utilisation: 
"The degree of utilisation or employment of capital is significant. 
Increasing spare capacity is quite consistent with a rising capital: 
labour ratio for this is likely to happen when demand falls relat ive 
to productive potential. As demand increases the capital: labour 
ratio will fa l l as new employees are used to work with the previously 
idle or under-employed capital goods. No ' shift in the production 
function will take^ ^Jace unless an irreversible change occurs in 
output per head". 
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Thus, the high net investment levels of the 1940s and early 1950s had 
' irreversibly' changed the production function to a more capital intensive one, 
and the rising capital-labour ratio's beginning in the late 1950s were not an 
indicator of capital intensity in production but rather symptomatic of 
excess capacity. The capital stock of the manufacturing sector had in fact 
been designed for a level of demand that did not materialise, so that changes 
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in employment did not accompany changes in net output - and by running 
machines for more hours without changing the number of employees, 
manufacturers were able to satisfy the increases in demand that occurred in 
the late 1950s and 1960s without having to hire more labour. 
The explanation for the excess capacity was of course rooted in the euphoria 
characterising the years after the Second World War, in that there was 
the 'high promise' that 'the then Southern Rhodesia would be the industrial 
centre for expanding markets within the Federation and supply goods also to 
other Afr ican countries'. 
This euphoria was to be fuelled by developments in agriculture a f ter 
the Second World War - which all combined to produce i l l-conceived 
strategies to supply labour to industry and attempts to improve 'human capital ' 
and manipulate internal demand. 
And until the late 1950s when the euphoria had somewhat dissipated, the 
settler state conceived a development strategy for agriculture in which 
the white farmers would provide the foreign exchange to fuel industrialisa-
tion, while the peasant sector would see to the production of food for the 
urban working class. Whereas before the Second World War - wages were 
inclusive of food rations - (and remained so for mine, agriculture; and 
domestic workers) - the labour force for the bourgeoning manufacturing 
industry, besides in some instances being ' f ed ' at lunchtime, purchased their 
own food, and there was an attempt at stabilising it, through State subsidisation 
of transport and housing. 
In the second wave of settler colonisation demobilised British soldiers were 
settled on either private or Crown land, under scheme No. I. of the Land 
Settlement Ac t of 1944, where they took to tobacco farming. Tobacco 
enjoyed considerable comparative advantage over maize, being less bulky to 
transport. One economist enthused about the "golden l ea f " and its 
implications for the economy of Southern Rhodesia: 
"A favourable combination of circumstances such as faces the 
tobacco industry of Southern Rhodesia occurs infrequently in 
the history of most countries. Growing more food in place of 
tobacco would probably mean a damping down of the rates of 
capital accumulation and economic development. For growth and 
development tobacco is the staple crop of Southern Rhodesia; 
tobacco is the dynamic staple and maize is only the static staple 
of the economy. Even if sel f -suf f ic iency in maize were reached in 
the bette^Reasons, imports would still be required during bad 
seasons". 
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The proportion of national income generated in agriculture only exceeded 
that produced in mining in the period af ter 1946. A f t e r 1946, the 
output of tobacco expanded rapidly under the stimulus of high and rising 
prices. European agriculture replaced mining as the most important source 
of income. The change was re f lected in the balance of payments in 1947, 
when for the f irst t ime agricultural exports (mainly tobacco) exceeded 
mineral exports in value. Up to 1939, gold mining had been the major 
industry, but the war years had seen its profitabil ity eroded by rising 
costs and the shortage of imported inputs. The low level of imports 
had led to a favourable balance of payments, and external assets reached 
record levels. Further the dollar shortage in the 1940s - the demand 
for and price of Southern Rhodesia tobacco rose to record levels and 
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output increased. It was only in 1953, with the ending of the 
inflationary boom that agriculture was surpassed by manufacturing. 
Impressive, though these developments might have looked on paper, they 
were largely illusory - and the growth had taken place in an enclave 
fashion with f ew if any linkages with industry. According to R.W.M. 
Johnson, the essential conditions for growth as set out by Colin Clarke -
still yet had to be met in Southern Rhodesia i.e. increases in the pro-
ductivity of agriculture had to take place before or combined with an 
advance in industrial employment and capacity in the absence of cheap 
food imports. And as we have seen above this was not happening. Further, 
Johnson argued, an expanding economy could have one or two e f f e c t s on the 
agricultural sectors: growth and productivity of the industrial sector might 
lead to a withering away of agriculture and substitution of its food 
products by imports. Alternatively, the lack of suitable cheap food 
imports could generate a competition for resources against the developing 
industrial sector. None of this had taken place in the Zimbabwe of the 
1950s. Johnson went on to stress that even the Rostovian preconditions of 
take-of f had yet to be met by the 1960s - as the very high ratios of capital 
formation had not been internally generated and were an e f f o r t to compensate 
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for the lack of these 'pre-conditions' of take-o f f . 
European agriculture did not therefore occupy so prominent a position as 
it claimed. From the failure of the tobacco industry to find a market 
before the war - and the declining employment levels from 1921 - 1941 -
there was the temptation to see in this trend the classical decline of agri-
culture leading to industr ia l i sa t ion .^ 
X 
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The growth of an economically viable export industry since World War II 
had had the e f f e c t of maintaining employment in agriculture very much 
higher than could be met by the country's food supplies, and it had been 
able to attract indigenous labour only because of the recurrent droughts 
up to 1951, and had to increasingly rely on foreign migrant labour. 
In the period under review the settler state sought to supply the cheap 
food through a combination of marketing and pricing strategies to provide 
the incentive to Afr ican farmers to produce food, and thorough going 
land reform, in the guise of the Land Husbandry Act . 
The need to rationalist the marketing system in accordance with the 
needs of the emerging industrial sector of the economy, soon became 
apparent a f ter the War. From 1947 to 1953, the country found itself 
importing its food. While food shortages were being reported in South 
and South-East, in some areas 1948 was considered a record for crop 
production - and in some areas the surplus of small grains which were also 
being imported, were so abundant that the crop had to be l e f t on the 
fields. ^ In order to provide the incentive for the production of 
small grains, the Grain Marketing Ac t was passed in 1950. Its main 
purpose was to stabilise producer prices, provide a guaranteed market and 
provide for an e f f i c i ent marketing service, safeguard supplies, and ensure 
equitable distribution under scarcity conditions. The pricing systems 
then in existence were taken over along with^the administrative functions 
associated with the Afr ican maize crop. The three small grain crops of 
sorghum, rapoko and munga were to be controlled through the trade agents 
in the same way as maize. Between 1949 and 1953, when records were 
being broken for tobacco production, and there was a boom in agricultural 
exports, 22% of the country's marketed maize was being imported. And 
though maize then accounted for 50% of all A fr ican sales, it only represented 
38% of production from settler farmers who were then cashing in on the 
tobacco bonanza. To further encou'rage maize production by Afr ican 
producers, regional pricing was introduced in the Grain Marketing Ac t of 
1957 which set up a Transport Equalisation Fund J ^ 
A system of subsidies also operated from 1948 to 1956. The subsidy was 
required to absorb the high cost of imported maize, and was really a 
consumer subsidy. The producer price was set very l i t t le under the local 
selling price - and very l i tt le benefit accrued to Afr ican producers whom 
it was meant to benefit . In times when maize had to be imported, the 
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subsidy kept the urban cost of living down through price control on maize 
meal, but in years of exportable surplus, the urban cost of living became 
excessively high J ^ 
A f t e r the 1949 devaluation, which led to an increase in maize prices - there 
was a rise in amount of maize marketed - but the experts in the Native 
Department who had been closely observing the. rise in lobola prices, calculated 
that too much attachment by the 'natives' to their banks i.e. the catt le in 
such circumstances would lead to a reduction of marketed surpluses, and they 
proceeded to intensify destocking. 
But the central and crucial strategy of transforming Afr ican peasants in 
Zimbabwe from providers of labour to a yeo-man class able to supply the 
cheap food to fuel industrialisation was in the Land Husbandry Ac t . 
This had been framed in the belief that population growth in the rural 
areas was slower than that in the territory as a whole and also in the 
belief that permanent urban migration was desirable and was to be encouraged. 
A t the rural end - the system of land registration and individual tenure, 
would halt the ecological collapse of the reserves by reducing the land-
carrying capacity. From the immediate post - war years and indeed up to 
the late f i f t i es , policymakers assumed that opportunities for urban 
employment would go on expanding - providing the 'pull' out of the system, 
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while in the enforcement of individual tenure would provide the 'push'. 
Pari passu with these developments was an attempt a f ter 1945 to give teeth 
to the Land Apportionment Ac t , by securing the placement of d i f ferent 
groups in their appropriate land categories. In 1948, a Committee under 
Max Danziger, recommended the transfer of 2 million acres from the Native 
Purchase Area to the reserves, in order to absorb squatters on white fam 
land; and native purchase area; roughly 5 600 000 acres was added to the 
reserves f rom the unassigned area J ^ 
Thus an intensive and extensive resettlement exercise was begun in 1950. 
In round figures from 1936 up to 1960, meant the compulsory removal of 
some 113 000 Afr icans from the various other categories of land to the 
reserves. This number was far from the full complement for whom land had 
to be found. The implicit intention of the Land Husbandry Ac t had been that 
this landless class would be industrialised but as we have seen, industrialisa-
tion was still a pipe dream. Not only were there famil ies to be resettled 
from European and other categories of land but also the residue of landless 
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persons who were accumulating as a result of the Land Husbandry Scheme. In 
1960, it was estimated that of families for whom land had to be found there 
were no less than 111 261 families. By comparison, the number of individuals 
actually resettled between 1936 and 1959, namely 113 000 men, women and 
children, represented but a f ract ion. ' ' 
In the expectation of an industrial boom, and with the emergence of a labour fo rce 
for whom food rations were not inclusive of wages, much attention 
became focused on food habits, in an attempt to improve the colony's 
human capital, and the Ministry of Health engaged in extensive publicity 
campaigns to teach employers of labour nutrition science. 
The poor physical condition of the average Zimbabwean had brought itself to 
the notice of the settlers, when during recruitment for the imperial war 
e f f o r t - of those who volunteered, perhaps as many as 50% were rejected as 
112 being unfit or unlikely to become e f f i c i ent . 
And medical evidence submitted to the Howman Commit tee of 1942 was 
'almost unanimous in stating that malnutrition is seriously prevalent 
everywhere in the urban areas, particularly among the factory (labourer 
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class)1. In addition to malnutrition, intestinal diseases and other 
infestations such as bilharzia and hookworm were seriously prevalent. 
And Chemists who specialised in the Afr ican trade "found that 'tonics', 
' fattening mixtures' and 'pick-me-ups' were a major line and the Bantu Mirror 114 carried expensive advertisements whose theme was "prevent that tired fee l ing" . 
A Nutrition Council was set up in 1948, and amongst some of its initial 
observations were: 
"The traditional habits of feeding in the kraal are clearly 
unsuitable for organised labour in industry and agriculture in 
the European areas. The high incidence of dietet ic def ic iency 
diseases among kraal natives makes it abundantly clear that their 
feeding habits are seriously at f au l t "J 
But of course there was no 'traditional' diet to talk of by the 1950s -
except in the sense of food habits adopted under the impact of land 
alienation. The Report of the Nutrition Council for 1958 noted that 
the incidence of kwashiorkor was rising particularly in rural areas where 
famil ies had been resettled: 
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"Generally these have been areas where a sudden change has taken 
place in the customary methods of food production. This has arisen 
through resett lement of a community on a d i f ferent type of soil in 
one case and in other cases, through prohibition of gardens on 
pasture land and destocking of cat t le " . ' 
The Nutrition Council's dietary survey in the Chikwaka Reserve near Harare 
in 1953 had reported poor diet in all the villages surveyed. Meat was in 
very short supply, and was only regarded as an 'occasional luxury'. Vegetables 
were practically non-existent as f ew of the kraals had gardens, mainly due 
to the f ac t that cultivation was not allowed within 70 yards of rivers, and 
vil lagers were not prepared to carry water that far . Further f ew of the 
kraals had wells and an inspection had shown that ' f rom the nutrition aspect 
alone, the provision of more wells' would have been most advisable. Some 
beans, groundnuts and soya beans were being grown, but relishes were 
not prepared more than once a week in most areas. Cow's milk was found to 
be 'non-existent and the diet depended almost entirely on mealie-meal (sadza). 
While other grains were grown, because of the miniscule acreage devoted 
to them, the only variety in the diet they were able to bring about was in 
the form of beer. The only vegetable mentioned was pumpkin leaves - but 
these were very seasonal. The common practice was ' to have an early morning 
meal of bread and tea, and these appeared to be the most important purchased 
foods, with the exception of the inevitable coca-co la"J ^ 
A t the work place, however, it was reported that: 'perhaps the most di f f icult 
art icle of food to persuade Natives to eat is green vegetables. In this they 
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d i f f e r l i t t le from European children" and it was recommended that: 
"Employers of small labour forces whose employees refuse other 
fresh vegetables, are therefore advised to provide only sweet 
potatoes, tomatoes, pumpkin, onion and leeks ... and for 
employers of large labour forces, ... if there is then any evidence 
of waste of vegetables, the best (and only) procedyij^ is to mince all 
meat and vegetables and to serve these together". 
On a more 'scienti f ic note' the Nutrition Council suggested the introduction 
of tortil la and tamale - but these met with consumer resistance because of their 
yel low colour and was associated with the 'Kenya' maize that the country had 
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been importing. Suggestions to have the millers produce maize meal 
enriched with calcium, riboflavin and niacin did not go very far - and more -
over fort i f icat ion was criticised on the grounds that it corrected only a f ew 
of the known deficiencies, but ignored others, such as protein deficiency and 
vitamins of the B complex other than riboflavin and niacin. Attempts to switch 
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to sorghum and mil let had also not met such success - and attempts to 
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encourage their cultivation in 1947 had led to a glut. 
As there was to be no radical change in productive relations and social 
structure which in the final analysis have conditioned hunger in Zimbabwe 
for the next f i f t e en years, and there was to be even more intensive 
exploitation, any change in the food habits of the 1950s was for the 
worse. The intensification of productive relations giving rise to this 
situation form the subject of the next section of the paper, which surveys 
the period 1965 - 1980. 
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THE APOTHEOSIS OF THE 'LOGIC' OF CAPITALISM IN 
COLONIAL ZIMBABWE, THE PENETRATION OF THE WAGE - FOODS SECTOR 
BY TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL -: 1965 - 1980 
In earlier sections of the paper, we have attempted to argue that chronolo-
gically, the origins of Zimbabwe's present 'hunger' problem (to those who 
recognise it as such) are to be found in the period 1930 - 1945. This was 
i 
hot so much so because the Land Apportionment Ac t was placed in the 
Statute Books of Southern Rhodesia. But rather that during the global 
crisis set o f f by the Great Depression, capitalist social relations of 
production, speci f ic to the settler political economy were instituted. 
These were to condition the whole issue of food production and consumption; 
the strategy of the settler state was more in the way of 'crisis' management 
than of a planned food policy. And the consequences of this for the 
application of labour power to the production of its own sustenance and 
reproduction, and the capitalist institutions that emerged during that 
period provide the crucial connection between the problems of low production 
growth in the communal areas and mass malnutrition. 
The period 1965 - 1980 is particularly relevant for the understanding of some 
of the dynamics of hunger in Zimbabwe. Analyses which have sought 
conceptually to separate the state from capital in colonial Zimbabwe have 
only managed to bring out a 'statist' explanation for the food crisis - • 
where the crisis which Zimbabwe has faced in the year 1981/2/3 - have been 
seen primarily in the adoption of 'wrong policies' and ultimately in the 
nature and structure of the bureaucracy. Economistic analyses have d i f fered 
l i t t le f rom this by seeking explanations of the food crisis in the structure 
and workings of the labour reserve economy - whose workings they interpreted 
only from the supply side of the equation. And therefore tend to see the 
solution to the present crisis, in terms of altering the supply functions of 
the labour reserve economy. Their historical explanation for the crisis 
has therefore, mechanistically coagulated all the supply functions of capital 
into the concept of ' fractions' of capital. Therefore in the case of 
Zimbabwe, attempts to understand the nature of the colonial state have delved 
into f inely tuned distinctions of 'metropolitan' capital and 'sett ler ' capital. 
Bayliss has however pointed out that it is: 
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"Not so much whether capital is foreign or settler, or even its 
sectoral location that determines its orientation to local 
economic expansion as the nature of its markets and the manner in 
which iljs,^pecific production dynamics govern its relations to 
labour (Emphasis not in Text ) 
In colonial Zimbabwe, particularly af ter the break-up of the Central Afr ican 
Federation the crucial dilemma faced by capital was how to raise the 
productivity of useful labour that produces the means of subsistence (or the 
inputs into the production). And no matter which particular combination 
constituted the settler elected government this came down to strategies 
by capital to reduce t-he value of the commodities the working class was 
receiving in order to reproduce itself . 
This emerges from a closer examination of the marketing and pricing policies 
during the period. Though after the imposition of trade sanctions one of the 
main objectives of the Smith regime was to conserve and earn foreign currency, 
the logic historically and materially imposed by the development of capitalism 
made the 'success' of the whole socio-economic system dependent on the 
successful pursuance of a cheap food policy. 
And it is worthwhile to explore theoretically how this can be achieved. 
According to Crouch and de Janvry: 
"The need for cheap wage foods can ... (then) be met in either 
one of two ways - imports or stimulation of capitalist 
production. Either of these two solutions is contradictory to 
other needs of the fractions of the capitalist class which 
control the state. Food imports compete with machinery and 
raw material imports which are necessary for the import 
substitution sector. Also, the only way to increase food imports, 
at least at certain stages of development is by increasing agro-
exports. But this competes with local food production and 
requires the stimulation of the agro-export sector which implies 
shifting state resources to the producers of export crops (cheap 
credit ) for example and therefore away from the import 
substitution sector. The stimulation of local production requires 
satisfying the economic demands of the wage - food capitalist group 
for rent - yielding high prices. This diminishes industrial 
capital 's expansion by forcing wages up to or transferring rent via 
cheap inputs as in the agro-export sector, whijd^ also goes 
against the interests of the industrial sector". 
As we have seen in the previous section, the settler state attempted to find 
its way out of this dilemma after the 1945 war by f irst, importing maize ( f rom 
\ 
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1947 - 53) hoping that the costs would be o f f se t by earnings accruing from 
the tobacco bonanza. But the fl inty yellow grain which made up the consign-
ments, met with sti f f consumer resistance. In tandem with the importation of 
maize, food production in the reserves and Afr ican Purchase Areas was 
encouraged by a subsidy from 1953 to 1956, and the Grain Marketing Act of 
1950, repealed policies which had provided a disincentive for food production, 
such as the Maize Control Ac t of 1934. But there was l i t t le conf l ict with the 
leading agro-export sector, - the tobacco industry, and indeed there had by 
then developed a measure of complementarity between the maize and tobacco 
industries: maize was, both a complement and substitute for Virginia tobacco. 
And generally, where tobacco prices have fal len, settler capitalist farmers 
substituted maize for tobacco. And as the area planted to tobacco has 
declined that planted to maize has increased. And to maintain gross turn-over 
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the acreage planted to maize has had to be increased. 
/ 
Thus it was not surprising that a f ter the downturn in tobacco prices a f ter 
1953, Southern Rhodesia actually exported maize, until 1963 though just a 
year previously it was importing it. The price for exported maize remained 
consistently below the producer prices for local requirements. The gross 
returns on exports were only between $2 and $6 per tonne higher than the 
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average price paid to producers. Imported maize in 1963 and 1964 was 
actually cheaper than locally produced maize. And in 1965 and 1966, though 
it was not cheaper than local maize, the cost of imported maize was still 
compet i t ive. 
Maize yields and area planted continued to increase a f ter 1966 - partly because 
of the imposition of sanctions, and the fal l in tobacco prices: but despite 
declining real prices for maize, there was a surplus produced for export in 
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1968. The evolving logic for the pricing of maize was that when it was 
imported its internal price was generally suppressed through a subsidy 
(1947 - 53), its production by capitalists was discouraged and it was relegated 
to favourably located peasants in the Afr ican Purchase Areas and Master 
Farmers, who produced using labour-intensive methods of ten for home or local 
consumption. However, the availability of maize for import was no guarantee 
that it would be imported. And as capitalists were already producing the crop 
on tobacco farms and on catt le ranches, they had enough leverage in the state 
apparatus to prevent imports. They nevertheless were prepared to accept low 
prices because of direct and indirect state subsidies. Given this logic the 
premium on maize in colonial Zimbabwe, despite declining terms of trade, was 
no act of irrationality as has been suggested in some quarters: 
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"It has been argued that the declining producer prices for maize 
were a result of government's attempts to cut down subsidy costs 
in support of a cheap food policy. Maize, however is a low-value, 
high-bulk commodity and with the increasing demands on the nation's 
transport faci l i t ies, the opportunity costs of exporting maize were 
high in terms of foreign currency earnings foregone. Furthermore 
in the period reviewed, maize was usually exported at a net loss. 
It is suggested therefore that whilst the country remained sel f-
suff ic ient and whilst lucrative export markets were y^va i l ab l e , 
there was no justification for a premium on maize". 
The premium on maize was dictated by the fac t that in a sense 
it was preferential ly produced by capitalists who af ter violently 
seizing the land at the turn of the century had become ' e f f i c i en t ' , and 
through the years had added to the stock through irrigation projects, 
nitrogenous ferti l isers etc. This e f f i c i ency and control of resourses 
had been translated into increasing production of maize at stable or 
decreasing prices. Even more fundamentally, maize had an absolute premium 
because its market was linked to that for livestock - feeds to that for 
wage foods. This point was driven home by the Southern Rhodesian Director 
of Census in 1959 when he wrote on the future of agriculture at that t ime: 
"There is l i tt le doubt that during the next decade increasing 
attention will be paid to securing a balanced diet for the Africans. 
This is important if only on the grounds of raising his productivity. 
The challenge facing the European farmer is that of producing maize 
at a price which will enable the increased purchasij-^ power of the 
Afr ican market to be spent on livestock products". 
(Emphasis Added) 
As part of the 'cheap food policy', the state kept the local selling price of 
1 maize static, from 1959 to 1972. This did not as would have been expected 
conf l ict with the interests of beef producers then emerging as an important 
export sector. There was a progressive concentration in catt le numbers in 
Mashonaland rather than Matabeleland af ter 1965. From September to December 
1970, bookings at the Bulawayo abattoir increased by 42 per cent, whereas 
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for Salisbury abattoir they increased by 121 per cent. Since this 
involved a shift from transhumant pastures, pen-feeding assumed prime 
importance. The profitabil ity of the beef industry was determined 
predominantly by the cost of feeder catt le, the cost of f eed grains, and the 
price of grain - fed catt le . Maize forms the major component of stockfeeds 
and thus pen - feeding of animals is governed by the maize - beef ratio. 
The movements of the Maize/Beef Ratio for the years 1971 - 1972 are 
shown in the table below. 
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MOVEMENTS OF THE MAIZE/BEEF PRICE RAT IO 
Y E A R 
(i ) 
MAIZE PRICE ($/+) 
<ii> 
BEEF PRICE (c/kg) 
Maize 
PRICE 
: Beef 
: RAT IO 
1971 32,51 36,76 1 11,3 
1972 29,60 40,38 1 13,6 
1973 37,30 48,81 1 13,1 
1974 43,52 56,82 1 13,1 
1975 48,25 58,96 1 12,2 
1976 48,00 57,00 1 11,9 
1977 52,00 57,91 1 11,1 
1978 53,00 57,26 1 10,8 
1979 60,50 70,46 1 11,6 
1980 85,00 81,11 1 9,5 
1981 120,00 105,00 1 8,8 
1982 120,00 128,00 1 10,7 
Source: A.G. Ingram Lock, 'Commercial Sector Marketing in Zimbabwe' 
Department of Land Management Working Paper. U.Z. 
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Despite sanctions, the beef export industry continued to prosper. As a basis for 
comparison, it can be noted that pre-U.D.I., in 1964 export of all meats (fresh, 
frozen and chilled) from Rhodesia totalled 17 192 tonnes at a value of $5 984 000. 
In 1966, exports of f rozen and chilled beef alone totalled 28 576 tonnes at a value 
of $11 458 000, and by 1975 these figures had risen to 40 752 tonnes and $24 247 000 
respectively. In money terms the value of Rhodesia's beef more than doubled during 
the f irst ten years of U.D.I. The producer price for slaughter catt le , which had been 
set at 32,88 c, per kg in 1966, remained relatively stable during the period until 
the 1970s; by 1974 it had reached 56,62 c per kg. It was not until the intensi-
f ication of the liberation war a f ter 1977 that deep cuts were made into the 
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profitabil ity of the beef industry. 
Beef production was run under a state monopoly by the Cold Storage Commission, and 
some export markets yielded a net return to the Commission far in excess of producer 
prices but they could not absorb the country's total production and other markets 
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'notably' the 'consumers' who had to be satisfied at returns below the 'net 
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ex-works realisation of the bone - in beef producer prices'. This of 
course was another aspect of the cheap food policy that underlined pricing and 
marketing policies. 
The state between 1965 and 1980 pursued a cheap food policy which managed to 
minimise competition between local food production and the agro-export sector, 
through act ive product and marketing policies. Through indirect consumer 
subsidies, the stimulation of food production was able to satisfy the economic 
demands of the wage food capitalist group for rent - yielding high prices, by 
keeping wage levels depressed throughout the period. In the absence of an 
internal capital goods or industry, meant that the agro-export sector was 
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substituted (by earning the currency with which machinery was bought). 
This meant that increases in productive investment/gross capital formation 
in the f irst ten years after U.D.I, may have led to further exports - but not 
to an internal expansion of the means of production. From 1967 - 1976 - a 
quarter of the gross f ixed capital for the country was accounted for by 
the manufacturing sector. 
Thus while the economy grew rapidly at an average real rate of growth of 
7,5 per cent from 1965 to 1974, the relatively high growth rates can be attributed 
to the utilisation of excess capacity. Ramsay has argued that the high net 
investment levels of the fort ies and f i f t i e s had ' irreversibly' changed the 
production function to a more capital-intensive one - and that rising 
capital labour: ratios beginning in the late 1950s did not r e f l ec t more 
capital-intensive development but rather widespread excess capacity. So 
excessive was manufacturing capacity by the end of Federation, that the 
expansion in manufacturing output of the late 1960s and 1970s occurred 
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despite no net new investment since the late 1950s. The import substitu-
tion that did take place was mainly in the direction of luxury goods, such 
as pet foods, breakfast cereals, cube sugar etc , for the consumption of 
high-income groups. During the period on average it has been estimated 
that low-income famil ies spent only 45 per cent of their expenditure on 
manufactured foods products, of which nine tenths was spent on basic items 134 
such as bread, f lour, milk and vegetable oils. ~ More significantly, 
during the period 1965 - 1980, there was an inflow of foreign, mainly South 
Afr ican capital which strengthened its hold on beverages, chemicals, non-
metall ic mineral products, and made further inroads into food manufacturing 
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and retailing. The food processing industry, by 1980, contributed nearly 
25 per cent of the output of the manufacturing sector of the economy. In 
/ 
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1970, and 1979 the industry was the second largest contributor a f ter 
mining in value added J 
/ • 
The only food sector not penetrated by agro-export transnational capital was 
the dairy industry which in the period 1965 - 1974 of all areas of agricul-
tural production sustained the lowest levels of prof itabil i ty. Dairy 
products were required for internal consumption only and Rhodesia could 
not compete with subsidised dairy products elsewhere. The period 1966-
1975 saw a drastic fa l l in both imports and exports. Sel f-suff ic iency 
was reached in 1969, and thereafter the industry was faced with the 
problems of overproduction. But in pursuance of the cheap food policy, 
there were no hitches in consumer prices as a means of ensuring producers 
prof itabil i ty, nor was there any subsidisation. Throughout the period, 
state control through the Dairy Marketing Board gradually absorbed other 
dairy trading agencies so that the Board's intake represented over 75 per 
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cent of national milk production. 
The penetration of transnational capital into the wage foods sector was 
not only promoted by the cheap food ^.policy, but also by the settler state's 
strategy of using capitalist irrigated agriculture to save foreign exchange 
by producing beef , sugar, cotton, citrus and wheat. 
An essential part of the diversif ication away from tobacco a f ter 1965 
was the heavy investment in water resources development in plantations in the 
south-eastern Lowveld owned by transnational corporations. The profitabil ity 
of lowveld agriculture depended on cheap labour, and underpriced 
irrigation water provided by the state subsidies for infrastructure development; 
the state also guranteed secure markets. For its part foreign capital 
supplied technology and marketing to ensure the success of the 'blooming' 
, + 138 desert. 
In order to encourage wheat production, a f ter independence, the state 
introduced high wheat prices after 1965. It was initially grown in the 
lowveld, encouraged by the Sabi-Limpopo Authority, and by 1971, despite a 
marked increase in demand, the country was producing 75% of its local 
requirements. A f t e r 1974/1975 the high prices o f f e red for wheat encouraged 
the expansion of irrigation in the highveld - in Mashonaland and by 1979, 
Mashonaland was producing 63% of the country's wheat. Agricultural 
research from 1954 - 1969 into suitable strains of irrigated winter wheat 
prepared the ground for the massive capital investment; e f f i c i en t production 
of wheat progressively became more dependent on market - purchased inputs and 
credit from the Agricultural Finance Corporation. Wheat indeed, for Zimbabwe, 
was the f irst major annual crop produced, that required a high f ixed 
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investment. 
Thus, in terms of food supplies colonial Zimbabwe had reached 'se l f -suf f ic iency ' 
by 1979, despite the exogenous e f f e c t s of the oil crisis of 1973 which 
sent the costs of such inputs as ferti l isers, chemicals rocketing. In 1979, 
there were 542 000 ha planted in the 'commercial ' cropping area, and 
unprocessed crop exports accounted for 18% of total exports. In 1978, 
food imports accounted for only 1% of the total import bill, though this 
increased to 2% in 1979, when as a result of the intensification of the armed 
140 struggle, declining acreages, drought, some maize had to be imported. 
Further from about 1976, the trading accounts of all controlled food products 
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were being run at a loss met from state revenues. Food sel f-suff ic iency 
cannot however be defined in a vacuum, but in relation to the values and 
needs of a particular society. And for the reproduction of capital and the 
needs of the settler political economy, food sel f -suf f ic iency was achieved 
in the years 1965-80. Similarly, given the mode of production the heavy 
farm indebtedness cannot be cited as evidence of the ' ine f f ic iency ' of white 
commercial agricultural production, unless one adopts a subjectivist 
definition of e f f i c i ency - which separates the settler 'state' f rom capital -
and which pays l i t t le attention to the various trade - o f f s in the reproduction 
of the settler political economy. In a market economy^ the only relevant 
test of e f f i c i ency is the farm's ability to survive as a producer of commodities 
while being able to 'pay i tsel f ' a return equal to that earned in other 
sectors - and it is of minor importance whether this was aided by the state. 
The ' ine f f ic iency ' of both capitalist agriculture and the state - lies more 
at the level of 'social ' inef f ic iency - i.e. the social relations of production -
and not some economistic determinants. 
The very ' e f f i c i ency ' of capitalist crop production, and its control of 
resources which were translated into increasing production of food crops at 
stable or decreasing prices - meant that the peasant's sel f -suf f ic iency 
was undermined as his range of possible act ivit ies was reduced as technological 
change penetrated the countryside. As a result, per capita production of 
peasant crops declined in absolute terms. And the level of food sel f -
suff iciency of peasant households has in Zimbabwe had l i t t le to do with 
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how much maize he has been able to produce for his own consumption - but 
rather how much he has been able to realise from sales to ensure a reasonable 
diet. And historical evidence from changes in diet shows that this has 
been the case since the 1930s. The whole issue, if viewed from an 
idealist romantic anti-capitalist view, wherein the fac t that peasant 
households have been locked into the production of commodities they do 
not consume, is meant to mean that both food production and food consumption 
are adversely a f f e c t ed and that the capacity for household autonomy and 
sel f-suff ic iency is undermined. Nutritional deprivation does not automatically 
fol low from the commercialisation of production and consumption as more 
commercialised and capitalised agriculture provides for more direct 
food consumption. The lack of ' food sel f -suf f ic iency ' has therefore 
more to do with the distribution of the social product of society. 
From the level of the household, sel f-suff ic iency can be viewed from two 
angles; according to Cowen. 
i 
i) a sel f -suf f ic iency household is that one that meets food requirements 
from the land to which the household is attached particularly when 
requirements are set out in nutritional terms as some necessary 
standard of consumption for productive work ... N oh - food 
requirements are also met separately and outside exchange relations, 
when-the household produces a surplus - a level of output greater than its 
food requirements. This gives rise to the ideal of subsistence 
agriculture, where there is no distinction between direct consumption, 
as the object of necessary food production (subsistence agriculture) 
and superfluous consumption as the object of surplus production 
(commercial agriculture). 
ii) the second and more realistic meaning of sel f -suff ic iency is that the 
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household reproduces 'its subsistence whether in a commercial form or 
not on the basis of family enterprise and not through the sale of 
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labour power which is necessarily a commercial act iv i ty . 
There fore associating 'peasant' or 'communal' with direct consumption and 
'white commercial farmer ' with commercialisation fails to def ine sel f-
suff iciency in accordance with di f ferential values that enter into the 
production and consumption of food. 
9 
And for the period under review i.e. 1965 - 1980 - when the production of 
wage foods was almost completely commercialised, it is there fore not 
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necessary to concentrate primarily on access to land, but to wider productive 
processes which determine the marked disparity between wages and prof i t . 
If a 'socio-economic analysis' of the hunger problem in Zimbabwe is not to be 
just a mere description of the signs and distribution of malnutrition and 
undernutrition, it is necessary to go from the abstract to the concrete. 
In previous sections of this paper we argued that by the end of the 1920s 
the precolonial staple of sorghum and millets was replaced by maize - which 
has sometimes been seen as a crop symbolical of the migrant labour economy. 
And for various nutritional experts, many arguing from the human capital 
point of view in the 1950s pointed out its shortcomings as a staple diet in 
terms of its def ic iencies in certain vital micronutrients. Simultaneously 
there was a concerted e f f o r t until the 1960s through extension programmes, 
provision of ferti l isers, improved seed hybrids to peasant farmers etc -
which improved yields. But with the decline in tobacco prices, capitalist 
farmers 'switched' back to maize. Peasant producers who were producing 
for consumption and for exchange, found themselves producing maize in 
unsuitable ecological conditions, requiring more inputs in the form of 
herbicides, ferti l isers and above all labour for weeding and cultivation -
and at the end of the day, producing maize for sale and buying back the 
processed product has become more convenient and cheaper. With the growth 
of wheat cultivation, backwards and forwardly linked to the food ' processing 
industry, operating within the confines of the state's cheap food policy -
a more convenient diet for the masses in the form of bread emerged in 
the U.D.I, era. 
The f ac t that bread has become or is becoming a staple diet is o f ten 
mystif ied by the commodity fetishism that presently surrounds maize, 
which interprets overproduction by 'peasants' as proof that peasants have 
always been rational in any case, but that it was the skewed pattern of land 
distribution, or disincentives in marketing and pricing which made them 
resistant to the market logic. 
In order to understand the dynamics of hunger in present day Zimbabwe, we 
however need in a sense to 'dive down^ beneath the appearance of exchange 
and production techniques to uncover the nature of capitalist social relations, 
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in terms of which the visible phenomena of exchange can be understood'. 
It is also necessary to re ject the methodology subjective preference 
theories which gives primacy to consumption, also that of cost of production 
theorists which gives primacy to production. For a dialectical analysis of 
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the social and economic aspects of hunger can only emerge in the methodology 
of the abstract theory of value, where production and consumption are seen 
as interdependent so that primacy cannot be a f forded to one sphere alone. 
As the whole question of sel f-suff ic iency and food habits is really about 
value: 
"It is not then the supply and demand that determines value 
but rather the labour time required for production. Those 
products that take longer to produce will have a higher value, 
this higher value will appear in a higher price of production, 
and if supply and demand paralyse each other, th i^^ r i c e of 
production will be the same as the market price". 
It is within such a perspective we intend to view the trends in peasant 
production and material culture from 1965 - 1980 in Zimbabwe. 
Firstly in respect to pricing and marketing policies adopted by the state 
a f ter 1965 - maize became an inconvenient crop. The state-owned Grain 
Marketing Board was charged with the responsibility of determining the 
shortage or otherwise of controlled products of which the staple maize was 
one, through the preparation of harvest estimates. 
For the years 1963/1964, Zimbabwe was importing maize, and in 1965, there 
were fears of drought, and for the 1965/66 season, based on its estimates, 
the Board announced that they would be unable to meet the local demand from 
locally produced supplies and yellow maize had to be imported. But by the 
end of the marketing season the Board found itself with a surplus because 
of late deliveries and there was congestion at its delivery points. As 
there was no government subsidy payable for locally produced maize, the 
losses incurred through the importation of yel low maize were met by the 
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government and the local selling price remained unchanged. Characteristically, 
the maize lobby in the state began to howl for protection against inef f ic ient 
Afr ican producers. In 1966 the Grain Marketing Ac t was passed. It aimed 
at controlling ' i l legal ' sales of maize by Afr icans in urban areas. The 
country was divided into two areas for the purposes of marketing maize. 
Growers in Area A (White Commercial Areas) could only sell their produce 
within these areas to the Grain Marketing Board whereas a 'B' area producer 
(Reserves/Communal Areas) could trade without restriction in his own area, 
but was compelled to sell to the Grain Marketing Board if his product was 
to be moved into an A area. From 1968 until 1973 despite dealing terms 
of trade 'white commercial ' production of maize continued to rise reaching 146 a peak in 1972 with a record crop of 1,7 million tonnes. 
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While this was happening in the so-called 'commercial sector1, data on 
Afr ican sales at the beginning of the 1970s revealed a 'small safety 
margin of food supplies in the surplus of grains over internal requirements -
within a surplus in the good years of only S per cent, while in the bad years 
it was as low as 1,5 per cent. While commercial farmers were achieving 
records in production, H. Dunlop, an agricultural economist at the local 
University was alarmed enough to write concerning trends in the 'tribal 
trust lands'. 
"The safety margin of food in the Tribal Trust Lands has fallen 
to a crit ical level a^L, c r ea t es a real threat of famine conditions 
in the near future". 
(Emphasis added) 
Dunlop went on to argue that this decline was a long-term trend. That 
from 1957 to 1972, the value of cash sales from the reserves remained static 
at around $8 million per annum notwithstanding a two- fo ld increase in rural 
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population. And the increases in yield were not as a result of 
increased productivity due to some magical input like the SR52 maize, but 
rather due to the extension of cultivation into grazing lands and marginal 
areas. 
In the 1974/1975 season, however, sales to the Grain Marketing Board again 
exceeded estimates - this t ime by 29%. The Agricultural Marketing 
Authority reported: 
"The subsequent marketing season of 1974/75 saw the Authorities' 
marketing agencies handling the largest sales ever made by Afr icans 
of those products for which the Authority is responsible. Recent 
years and particularly 1972 and 1973, have been notable for the 
increased value of sales by Africans but 1974 topped these 
by a considerable margin". 
1974 of course was the year of the world economic recession, which put 
paid to what till then had been considered the success of U.D.I. Between 
1975 and 1976, the economy declined at a rate of 1,4 per cent and further 
declines of 7,4 per cent and 3,1 per cent were recorded respectively, in 
1977 and 1978. The gross domestic product between 1975 and 1978, in real terms 
fe l l by 12,1% and in per capita terms, the decline was over 20% - meaning 
that living standards were cut by a f i f th . 1 5 0 More significantly, the total 
number of workers in formal wage employment which had reached a peak of 
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1 055 000 in 1975 declined continuously between 1976 and 1979; it fe l l by 
65 000 or 6,2% of the peak level in 1975. 1 5 1 Without any research 
having been done into the impact of these developments on the communal areas 
it can only be l e f t at the level of conjecture, whether the declines in 
levels of employment had the e f f e c t of increasing the labour available 
to the Afr ican rural household producing the 'record figures and the 
largest sales' made by Africans. 
s I 
A significant trend a f ter 1974, was the declining profitabil ity of maize 
and the rise in production of wheat. Following the rise in commodity 
prices triggered o f f by the rise in world prices in 1974, the Agricultural 
Marketing Authority paid record producer prices, but these were in any 
o f f s e t by the rise in imported input costs. With the fallback in prices 
in 1975, there was a downward revision of producer prices. A maize price 
agreement which had guaranteed government support for a minimum producer 
price was not reviewed and the state resorted to alternative means of 
assisting maize producers - by increasing the local selling price which 
until the end of the 1975 season had remained static for close to 15 years. 
But the rebates on maize used for stockfeeds were retained. There were 
further declines in commodity prices for maize during the second quarter of 
1977, with a slight recovery in 1978. The state consistently refused to 
o f f e r a higher pre-planting price to the chagrin of the maize producers. 
Due to the disincentives of the pricing system, and the e f f e c t s of the 
liberation war on farming operations there was a decline in the tonnage 
delivered to the Grain Marketing Board: in the 1974/75 season, 1 337 million 
tonnes was delivered. This had fallen to 877 000 tonnes in the 1978/79 
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seasons, which represented a decline of some 34 per cent. And while the 
country was barely meeting its requirements for maize, irrigated winter 
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wheat exceeded domestic requirements by over 40 per cent in 1978. 
The shift from maize to wheat, meant that maize production now became 
relegated more and more to the communal areas - where the technology 
for its production was so labour-intensive and the only way the communal 
producer could gain a compet i t ive edge of the capitalist farmer, was 
by over-exploiting his own family. Survival for the Afr ican rural 
population in such circumstances depended on the high cost of or unavailability 
of imported inputs (chemicals, fuel, ferti l isers e tc ) for the highly capitalised 
settler maize producers, and on their poverty. Wheat, which was increasingly 
becoming an essential component of wage foods, became the most 'dynamic 
capitalist crop'. 
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Population pressure and widespread land degradation became major problems in 
the communal areas. Estimates indicate that over the period 1961 to 
1977, the number of communal area cultivators increased by 88 per cent from 
359 000 to 675 000. The total area under cultivation increased by 91 
per cent from 1,15 to 2,2 million hectares at the expense of grazing 
land. Catt le numbers increased by 70 per cent from 2 million to 3,4 
million, resulting in overstocking of the reduced grazing area. However, 
the breakdown in disease control during the liberation war resulted in 
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the loss of at least 1 million catt le in communal lands. Although 
the catt le population fe l l the number of cultivators increased resulting 
in draught power problems, which led to delayed crop establishment by the 
majority of households J 
Shumba's study shows that the fal l in herd size and the increase in the 
number of non-cattle owners and the use of cows for draught power have 
been exarcebated by the lack of dry season catt le feed resulting in 'weak 
catt le and a reduced draught power pool to service an increasing number 
of cultivators' at the beginning of each season leading again to late 
. 156 planting. 
Reduced ti l lage techniques in the communal areas by 1980 had led to serious 
problems for the production of maize; early weed infestation, incorporation 
of manure, pests and diseases. ' ^ Under such conditions, the struggle 
by many communal area. cultivators not only to realise sales for a commodity 
whose market value had by 1979 plummetted, but also to produce for their own 
consumption, was indeed desperate. The risk of 'starvation' however did not 
necessarily show itself in such conspicious events as the famines in 
Ethiopia and the Sahel. But rather in the state of perpetual under-
nourishment. 
Such was the food problem inherited by the Zimbabwean state at independence. 
In the next and penultimate section of the paper, we shall review the 
changes which have taken place since independence. 
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THE STATE AND FOOD POLICY SINCE 1980 -
FOOD SECURITY IN THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 
The problem of 'hunger' was one of the main contributory factors to the 
downfall of the settler political economy in Zimbabwe. 'Hunger' is 
however always very di f f icult to define. The di f f icult ies in defining 
it relate mainly to the problem of value - i.e. whether the total value 
in a given society is interpreted from a subjective preference theory of 
value, or from the abstract labour theory of value. 
Much of the di f f icult ies in understanding the evolution of food policy in 
Zimbabwe a f ter independence relate primarily to misunderstandings about 
the role of the 'state ' . Too often, from an historical, albeit cynical, 
perspective the state is perceived in purely technocratic terms. From 
which the present food crisis in A f r i ca is explained away by 'ignorance' or the 
158 
implementation of W o n g policies'. And taken even further, it has 
been argued that these 'wrong policies' or mistakes arise not primarily 
because Afr icans have not been able to match the cultural e f f i c i ency of 
the colonial masters, but because state ' interference ' in exchange and 
production always leads to disasters. 
Without any attempt to clearly understand the nature of the 'state ' in 
Zimbabwe, some continuity is being posed between the pre-independence state 
and the post-independence state - insofar as their role in agricultural 
production, pricing and marketing are concerned. But even if one is able 
to demonstrate market inef f ic iencies in the period 1965 - 1980, that proves 
that commercial farmers were not a 'success element ' - this does not 
take us very far in prescribing solutions to the present problem. 
Mumbengegwi, for instance, has written that: 
"The general view in Zimbabwe is that commercial farmers are seen not 
as a fai lure but a success element in agriculture. Whereas the 
latifundia and other feudal forms of ownership distorted the 
agrarian structure in a negative manner, capitalist commercial 
farmers in Zimbabwe are seen to contain some positive elements from 
productivity ^ n d e f f i c iency considerations that ought to be 
preserved". 
While this might have been so at the t ime Mumbengegwi wrote his article, 
since the publication of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Agricultural Industry the general view of pre-independence agriculture 
has been somewhat tempered, as the Commission reported: 
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"It is not uncommon for Zimbabwe's agricultural prowess to be 
upheld as a model for other nations on the continent. What is 
less commonly appreciated is that Zimbabwe's a g r i c u l t u r a l 
industry overall has been in a state of decline over the past 
decade. While there have been major gains in productivity in parts 
of the industry, these have been o f f se t by the increasing 
deteriorating of the communal areas. ... although Zimbabwe 
has improved its agricultural productivity over the decade, this 
improvement, as is the case in most of A f r i c a , has not kept pace 
with population growth. The implication here is that, regardless 
of the profitabil ity of some agricultural enterprises, the 
overall profitabil ity of agriculture has not been suff icient to 
encourage the substantial increases in production need to match 
population growth". 
The emerging 'general v iew' with respect to agricultural and food policy 
is that the institutional structures for channelling state intervention in 
products pricing and marketing inherited at independence should be retained, ^ 
and that the state should also play an increasingly interventionist role in 
providing the incentives, credit and technical assistance to the previously 
disadvantaged small-scale farmers, but should take a back seat as far 
as the redistribution of consumption is concerned: 
"A further factor of which cognisance should be taken by the 
government is the destabilising e f f e c t of general wage awards 
upon the agricultural industry, which has to plan its operations 
well in advance and is usually precluded from recoverinjE^ 
increased labour costs through increased selling prices". 
State intervention in wage and labour policies is now in fac t being seen 
as a threat to the country's food security, as Professor Hawkins writes: 
"The World Bank stresses that government overall economic 
policies and programmes are crucial to agricultural sectors in 
Third World economies. This is particularly so where wage 
and labour policies are concerned. While the need to improve 
the pattern of income distribution in developing countries 
is widely acknowledged, new ways of doing this must be found. 
In the past, the emphasis has been on the combination of minimum 
wage policies on the one hand and price programmes on the other. 
Al l too often, this policy framework has worked against agriculture 
by controlling its output prices simultaneously pushing 
up wages and other input costs". 
The fac t that Zimbabwe has a major malnutrition problem precisely concentrated 
among the commercial farm workers, is hardly addressed - and exactly how 
expanded food production will be translated into expanded food consumption by 
the malnourished is l e f t to the mechanisms of the subjective preference theory. 
But using total production expansion as a proxy for nutritional e f f e c t is 
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highly mischievous and misleading. 
•v 
Inequities in both production and consumption are not primarily functions 
of the technical dimensions of physical production, but are an expression of 
the distribution of power between classes. And these power relationships 
can only be understood from a historical perspective, incorporating the 
methodology of the abstract labour theory, which integrates the spheres of 
production and consumption. In this the State's role is not to ensure 
the success of capitalism. Rather the state is a vital instrument in the 
defeat of capitalism, and its planning role has to be primarily in directing 
production enterprises as the expression of a redistribution of power 
between classes. 
(i ) Some Salient features of the post-independence economy with special 
re ference to food production. 
The coming of independence and the end of the war brought with it positive 
real rates of growth. In 1980/ the economy expanded by no less than 
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14% - restoring in one year all the lost output of the recession years. 
Zimbabwe's real Gross Domestic Product increased nearly 27% in the f irst 
two years of independence - on the strength of the l i f t ing of sanctions, 
stockpiles and the 1980/81 bumper harvest. Preliminary estimates at the end 
of 1984 suggested that in the two subsequent years, the real G.D.P. fe l l by more 
than 8% and with a decline of between 1% and 2% expected in 1984, real output 
in 1984 was only 3% above its 1980 l eve ls . 1 6 5 
Independence however did not remove some of the structural problems in the 
economy, inherited at independence in particular the relationship of Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation to Gross Domestic Product. This fe l l from between 
20% and 30% of G.D.P. in the early seventies to around 15% for the period 
1978 to 1980. The low level of capital formation has contributed to 
'excessive ageing of the country's machinery and equipment' as l i t t le had been 
invested since the mid-1950s for replacement of worn-out equipment.1 6 6 
Having inherited such a weak productive capital stock, the economy was not 
able to sustain the post-independence demand upsurge without serious inflationary 
pressures or incurring a massive foreign debt abroad to obtain imports that 
would add to domestic supply. A t independence, Zimbabwe was in balance of 
payments di f f icult ies, worsened by the 1979 oil shock. For the 1980 - 82 
period, the situation had worsened because of the recession, and the drought. 
Debt service ratio which in 1978 was a mere 0,9 per cent, by 1981 
was already 16%. The fol lowing year it took up more than a quarter of 
the country's earnings and in 1983, it rose to 3 0 % ^ ^ 
The manufacturing sector has been experiencing problems of declining output 
associated with the shortages of foreign currency. In general, in the 
consumer goods range, those industries registering the most substantial 
declines were those that experienced the most rapid growth during the 
post-independence boom. In the f irst year to eighteen months a f ter 
independence, clothing and furniture output went up by 50% and 33% respectively, 
while foodstuf fs production increased at an annual rate of slightly less 
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than 10%. By September 1983 the production of wood and furniture had 
fal len to 60% of the level reached in mid-1981 at the height of the post-
independence boom and output of clothing and footwear had fallen to 80%. 
Most manufacturing groups recorded substantial declines in output for 1982 
and 1983. By the end of 1983, output of non-metallic mineral products 
was down by 18%, paper, printing and publishing by 17%, transport equipment 169 by 15% and metals and metal products by 14%. 
The exception to this general tendency of decline in manufacturing has 
been food manufacturing. This had become well established by the t ime 
of independence, and has fared better than the other sectors, because it 
is less dependent on foreign currency for imported materials than any 
of the other manufacturing groups. From 1981 - 1983, the volume of food 
production rose by 30% although the rate of increase began to slow down 
in the second half of 1982. The drought undoubtedly led to this 
increase. The pattern of output by June 1984 had however altered considerably 
as consumers moved away from highly refined and "non-essential foodstuffs 
to the purchase of basic lines. Hence the producers of highly processed 
foods began to f ee l a fa l l in demand several months before the producers 
of staples. By the end of 1983, the demand for 'basics' was reaching a 
limit imposed by declining real disposable income and a slowing down of 
the increase in demand was registered early in 1984. 1^ Almost 
14% of industrial production in Zimbabwe takes the form of the further 
processing of foodstuf fs while other agro-based industries such as tobacco 
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and beverages, wood and texti les, account for a further 22% of output. 
In 1982, Agriculture was the single largest source of employment, absorbing 
a third of wage employment - next was manufacturing (15%), private 
domestic service (11%), public administration (7%), mining and communication 
(4%). O f f i c ia l f igures show that agricultural employment on commercial 
f rms grew erratically, - to reach a peak of some 366 000 employees in 
1974 - 35% of total employment in the formal economy. In 1984, commercial 
1 
farm employment was estimated at around 260 000, a decline of almost 30%. 
As a result of the 1980/81 bumper harvest, there was an 89 per cent improve-
ment in 1981 in gross f ixed capital formation. But with the onset of the 
drought, agricultural output is estimated to have declined by 15% in 1982. 
In 1983 the value of crop sales from communal areas was 30% down on the 
previous year. Despite the drought, 1984 was a record year for the 
agricultural sector: for the sector as a whole, the output in volume terms, 
is estimated to have exceeded the 1983 output by 22% and 3% above the 
174 previous record level achieved in 1981. 
In the fol lowing parts of this section of the paper we shall attempt to 
analyse the impact of the post-independence state's intervention, f irstly 
on the allocation of labour power, and then on agricultural production. 
The State Commercial farmers and labour power since 1980:-
Removal of the Labour Subsidy. 
Much of the debate stimulated by the World Bank's advice for ways of 
overcoming the hunger problem misses the crucial point underpinning the 
various positions taken. In weighing the costs of production of the 
various inputs and outputs of agriculture, and how these are likely to be 
influenced by the degree of state intervention - labour power is totally 
l e f t out of the equation. Labour power is the potential for work, as 
opposed to labour which is the actual work done. While the removal of 
subsidies on food commodities has received much attention, its gradual 
removal from the commodity of labour has almost been ignored. 
For capitalist production and the extraction of surplus value to have taken 
place in colonial Zimbabwe, labour power had to be allocated amongst 
i 
d i f ferent sectors of the so-called modern economy. This was not done via a 
' f r ee market' except for Whites, Coloureds and Asians - because a central 
state operated labour exchange (particularly in the case of agriculture, mining 
and domestic service) informed each of its branches to what geographical area, 
industry and occupation it could supply its registered Afr ican work seekers. 
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In the early years of the twentieth century, farmers joined with mining 
interests to establish co l lect ive recruiting agency for the importation 
of foreign workers through the Rhodesian Nat ive Labour Bureau.1 7 5 This 
'col lectivisation' of contracted labourers was designed to supplement the inflow 
of workers entering the colony as independent ' f r e e f l ow ' migrants. But most 
importantly it was also aimed at recruiting costs of private individual 
recruitment agencies. In the post-1946 period a parastatal - the 
Rhodesian Nat ive Labour Supply Commission (later changed to Rhodesian 
Afr ican Labour Supply Commission (RALSC ) f i l led a similar role and in the 
1960s functioned exclusively for 'commercial ' a g r i c u l t u r e . 1 W h i l s t 
colonial Zimbabwe as a whole built up a high level of dependence on foreign 
labour, throughout the 1900 - 1940 period, commercial agriculture, as a low 
wage sector was even more dependent on state subsidisation in the allocation 
of this labour. Under the contract system the R.A.L.S.C. imported the 
equivalent of 338 204 workers working one year, or an average inflow of 
13 528 from 1946 - 1971.177 
This directed process had several implications for the overall 'cheapness' of 
Afr ican labour power. First, given that the Commission (i.e. RALSC ) 
made most allocations to capitalist agriculture it increased the reserve army 
for this sector, thereby tending to reverse the urban directed migration 
trends a f ter 1945. Curtis writing on South A f r i ca where a similar sy-
stem still prevails has described how this mutual subsidisation operated: 
"The state - directed system of the allocation of Afr ican labour 
power is here understood as a subsumed class process. It reproduces 
a condition of existence for the extraction of surplus value: the 
allocation of Afr ican labour power to various capitalist employments 
(and in such a way as to lower Afr ican wages). Y e t it also 
requires the distribution of surplus value to the state in the form 
of taxes (and also labour recruiting fees paid directly to the 
bureaux), thereby rendering Afr ican labour power both cheap in 
the sense of wages paid ai j i^costly in terms of the tax support of 
this system of allocation". 
But a fundamental contradiction was that these 'centrally specif ied distri-
butions' reduced labour productivity as Afr ican workers were allocated jobs for 
which they either had l i t t le interest or experience. This tended to reduce 
output f rom what it otherwise would have been, and thereby also to lower 
rates of prof i t and surplus value, ceteris paribus. To compensate, so as to 
raise productivity, many commercial farmers employed relatively large numbers 
of white supervisors and managers - "subsumed class supervisors" whose wages 
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represented a further drain on the extracted surplus value - in other words, 
another cost of reproducing this system of Afr ican labour power allocation. 
Frequent references are of ten made to the relat ive privi lege of the urban 
workers without real close analysis for whom this 'privi lege ' operated, 
and the complex contradictions inherent in the system. Thus the Commission 
of Inquiry into the Agricultural Industry states: 
"Government labour policy since independence has unfortunately 
continued the 'urban' jp^s of previous administration, albeit with 
a d i f ferent emphasis". 
This 'privi lege' has to be placed in an historical context. Following the 
growth of the manufacturing sector, and the consequent increase of a 
labour fo rce in urban areas, a f ter 1945 for whom the methods of control 
used in agriculture and mining could not be applied a set of institutional 
arrangements were devised in colonial Zimbabwe, largely modelled on the 
South Afr ican system. 
This involved subsidised housing and transport under the Services Levy Ac t 
of 1960 under which employers of urban labour were charged a f e e by local 
government authorities to compensate sub-economic rents and bus fares. 
This housing and transportation must be understood as being capitalist wage -
commodities. The state production and sale of these commodities has been at 
prices less than their values, being 'subsidised' by the redistribution of 
surplus value in three ways. First, these wage - commodities were 
financed out of general tax revenues of the state. Second they were 
supported by specif ic levies paid by f irms not directly providing housing for 
their labour. Finally they were also subsidised, again as required by statute 
by the redistribution of the prof it from the production of municipal 
'traditional' beer to Afr icans in townships. 
The subsidisation of township housing and transportation undoubtedly 
mitigated some of the e f f e c t s of the reduction in the disposable income 
of Afr icans, since their real purchasing power fe l l less than did their money 
income, thereby helping to maintain real consumption and it was hoped their 
labour productivity. However, this subsidy benefited only those Afr ican 
workers who lived in or near white areas - mostly those employed in the 
manufacturing, construction, service and government sectors. 
V 
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The consumption of rural - based mining workers and agricultural workers 
was not so 'subsidised - as the state did not purchase wage - commodities at 
prices lower than their value. Instead, as studies by Van Onselen and 
Phimister have shown, miners were given food in order to increase productivity, 
and houses often of the worst type, were built for farm labourers to 
compensate for the rural - urban wage gap. 
This provision of 'in kind' use values to Afr ican miners and farm labourers 
was meant to compensate for their lower money wages as compared to urban 
manufacturing workers, and increase their real consumption and hence their 
labour productivity and the rate of surplus value. But as we mentioned 
in an earlier section of the paper - this did not happen, and historically 
agricultural and mineworkers have constituted the most malnourished 
segment of Zimbabwe's population. 
There were several other contradictions: f irst ly, an addition was made 
to the 'money' value of Afr ican labour power, thus directly reducing its 
cheapness. The particular form in which the 'in kind' value of labour 
power was provided - i.e. by insanitary and overcrowded housing, poor and 
inadequate rations, led to protests, demonstrations, desertions etc . - all 
of which reduced labour productivity and the rate of surplus value, and 
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hence increased the 'subsumed class costs of supervisors and police ' . 
The introduction of minimum wage legislation for agricultural workers 
which ended 'wages in kind' was indeed a major crisis for capitalist 
agriculture in Zimbabwe; the crisis was worsened by the resett lement 
programme, and the removal of institutional support for allocating labour 
power. Tobacco growers who in 1980 following the l i f t ing of sanctions 
were hoping to see a repetition of the halycon days of the 1950s were the 
worst a f f ec ted . Tobacco is the most labour-intensive, and the elasticity of 
factor substitution is relatively low. A t independence, tobacco growers 
employed 34% of the agricultural labour force . Its special case was 
advocated by a group of academics at the local university in 1980 in the 
fol lowing contradictory manner: 
"A sound pricing policy for the agricultural industries together 
with a moderate wage policy will do much to encourage the needed 
food production and stem the dri f t of people to urban areas. Food 
def ic i ts and urban unemployment plague much of A f r i ca ; Zimbabwe 
has initiated the appropriate policies to avoid tj^^se'problems. The 
need now is to build on this sound foundation". 
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By 1984, commercial agriculture was still the largest employer of labour 
1 i 
in Zimbabwe, with some 220 000 permanent and casual employees. It was 
estimated that since 1979, there had been a rise of 250% in the cost of labour, 
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giving rise to a decline in the number employed. 
Two points are not clear in all these assertions that the state's labour 
legislation is a threat to the country's food sel f -suf f ic iency. Firstly, 
do these labour costs include payment in kind? Secondly what is the 
ranking in terms of input costs of labour? No clear answer has yet emerged 
but the fol lowing tables showing the variable cost per hectare for wheat, 
maize, tobacco and cotton, show some interesting trends on the relative weights 
of labour inputs compared to technical inputs. 
For wheat, the variable cost of labour per hectare was 5% of the total in 
1980/81 and by 1984/85 was 9%. That for ferti l iser and lime was 
33% in 1980/81, and had declined to 31% in 1984/85. Costs of 
irrigation went up by 4% in the same period. 
For maize, the percentage of labour rose by 5% in the same period 
from 17% to 22% ferti l iser and lime declined from 37% to 34%. For 
tobacco, the variable cost per hectare actually declined from 39% of the 
total costs in 1980/81 to 33% by 1984/85. 
In terms of labour inputs, cotton underwent the steepest decline -
from 35% in 1980/1981 to 24% in 1984/1985. The sharpest rise for 
cotton was in repairs and maintenance costs, which went up by 10% in the 
period. 
W H E A T 
V A R I A B L E C O S T PER H E C T A R E IN $ PER HA: 
S e e d 
fertil iser and L ime 
C h e m i c a l s 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Fuels and Oils 
Repairs & Maintenance 
Contract/Combine 
Aerial S p r a y i n g 
Levy 
Transport 
1984/85 % 1983/84 % 1982/83 % 1981/82 % 1980/81 % 
54 6 50 6 34 6 31 6 28 6 
296 31 213 27 213 35 178 33 153 33 
26 3 20 3 17 3 14 3-
11 2 
83 9 79 10 47 7 30 7 
22 5 
193 20 174 22 95 15 79 15 
72 16 
43 5 42 5 .29 b 42 8 
42 9 
98 10 83 11 62 10 65 12 
58 13 
75 8 65 8 65 10 55 10 
48 11 
26 3 21 3 13 2 9 2 
4 1 
1 
6 1 5 1 13 2 4 1 3 
38 4 32 4 32 5 32 
6 14 3 
938 100 784 100 615 100 542 100 
457 100 
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B. 
MAIZE: 
V A R I A B L E C O S T PER H E C T A R E IN $ PER HA: 
\ 
1984/85 
Seed 
Fertiliser and Lime 
Chemicals 
Labour 
Fuels and Oils 
Repairs & Maintenance 
Aerial Spraying 
Crop Insurance 
Levy 
Transport 
28 
241 
45 
154 
50 
112 
15 
5 
5 
45 
% 
4 
34 
6 
22 
7 
16 
2 
1 
1 
6 
1983/84 
24 
172 
50 
148 
48 
96 
8 
4 
4 
42 
% 
4 
29 
8 
25 
8 
16 
1 
1 
1 
7 
1982/83 
22 
172 
39 
148 
33 
70 
6 
4 
4 
42 
% 1981/82 % 1980/81 
4 
32 
7 
27 
6 
13 
1 
1 
1 
8 
19 
154 
34 
94 
47 
57 
6 
3 
3 
42 
4 
34 
7 
21 
10 
12 
1 
1 
1 
9 
17 
139 
29 
65 
47 
52 
5 
3 
3 
18 
% 
4 
37 
8 
17 
12 
14 
1 
1 
1 
5 
700 99 596 100 540 100 459 100 
378 100 
VARIABLE COST PER HECTARE IN $ PER HA: 
C . TOBACCO: 
Seed 
Fertiliser 
Chemicals 
Labour 
Fuels and Oils 
Coal 
Repairs & Maintenance (machinery) 
Repairs & Maintenance (other) 
Aerial Spraying 
Insurance 
Levy &• Selling 
Transport 
Packing Materials 
1984/85 % 1983/84 % 1982/83 % 1981/82 % 1980/81 % 
3 - 3 — 2 1 1 
298 10 195 8 188 9 174 10 147 11 
336 11 260 11 171 8 149 0 125 10 949 33 871 35 871 40 579 34 503 39 
123 - 4 118 5 82 4 101 6 101 8 
. 316 11 250 10 232 11 170 10 94 7 
277 9 236 10 174 8 101 6 101 8 
141 5 125 5 111 5 74 4 67 5 
27 1 
170 6 177 7 137 6 178 10 82 6 
198 7 161 7 175 8 139 8 48 4 44 2 33 1 33 1 33 2 14 1 
27 1 20 1 18 1 20 1 18 1 
2 909 100 2 449 100 2 194 100 1 719 100 1 301 100 
VARIABLE COST PER HECTARE IN $ PER HA: 
COTTON: D. 
Seed and Seed Dressing 
Fertiliser and Lime 
Chemicals 
Labour 
Fuels and Oils 
Reoairs & Maintenance 
Ae:'ial Spraying 
Cotton Pack 
Levy 
Transport 
Crop Insurance 
1984/85 
17 
136 
183 
211 
68 
153 
63 
3 
16 
14 
864 
% 
2 
16 
21 
24 
8 
18 
7 
100 
1983/84 
17 
98 
157 
206 
65 
130 
47 
5 
14 
13 
752 
% 
2 
13 
21 
27 
9 
17 
6 
1 
2 
2 
100 
1982/83 
13 
98 
107 
206 
45 
93 
43 
3 
15 
13 
636 
% 1981/82 % 1980/81 
2 
15 
17 
32 
7 
15 
7 
0.5 
2 
2 
99,5 
4 
92 
134 
194 
35 
43 
48 
_ 3 
12 
13 
3 
581 
1 
16 
23 
33 
6 
7 
8 
1 
2 
2 
1 
100 
4 
72 
113 
180 
39 
43 
37 
2 
12 
5 
3 
510 
% 
Source: Windmill Profit Planner in Supplement to The Farmer October 22, 1984. 
i 
14 
22 
35 
"1 
8 
7 
0 
2 
1 
1 
101 
\ 
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Thus far , vve have tried to establish what in fac t distinguishes the pre-
independence from the post-independence period with regards to the state's 
and agricultural production - and we have argued that it has been the 
removal on the subsidy for labour. In the next subsection of the paper we 
shall consider the state 's role in regulating consumption - and to what 
extent this has been determined by a move away from the cheap wage food 
policy characteristic of the pre-independence era or whether it has been 
as a result of I.M.F.- imposed demand management strategies. 
(iii ) State macro-economic policies and consumption since 1980. 
The debate on whether the austerity measures adopted by the state in 1983 were 
'home grown' or were imposed by the I.M.F., has aroused much controversy and 
183 
bitter recriminations. While from short-term considerations the 1983 
Budget seemed to be a product of the I.M.F. - from the long-term perspective, 
imposed by the projected transition to socialism - the austerity measures 
particularly those removing food subsidies, were indeed 'home grown' - as 
these had been intricately linked to the cheap wage food policy of the settler 
state - and was aimed at minimising labour costs all round, which are 
inappropriate for balanced industrialisation. 
From 1980 - 1983, the state ran expansionary budgets, re f lect ing the 
184 
general optimism about the prospects for the economy. On the surface 
of things, this did not seem to be a deliberate 'choice' by the state to 
pursue an expansionary policy based on financing rather than adjustment. In 
the immediate short term these policies were successful as there was rapid 
growth in the f irst two years of independence, with employment picking up to 185 
reach the peak 1974 levels by 1982. If expectations about the end 
of the world recession and drought have materialised - there might have been 
long-term growth of the economy. 
But by mid - 1982j it was increasingly apparent that with a deteriorating, 
worsening fiscal position, growing indebtedness, and drought - a switch in 
policy had to be made. The dollar was devalued, and the government introduced 
additional measures expected to yield an additional $150 million. General 
sales taxes on selected consumer durables of 18 - 23% were imposed. 
Devaluation of the dollar was expected to raise the domestic price of exports, 
raising prof i t margins and thereby stimulating investments. This was not 
to happen, for though prof i t margins of export f irms increased, this was not 
matched by increased investment. Levels of exports rose by only 7% in 
nominal terms but in real terms declined by over 30%. Consequently there 
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was no appreciable rise in employment in the tradeable sector to compensate 
for the deflationary e f f e c t s of the demand management measures on the non-
tradeable sec tor . 1 8 6 
Even if one attempted to sustain the argument that removal of subsidies was 
a move away from cheap wage-food policy, the timing of the removals of the 
subsidies had the e f f e c t of harming the intended beneficiaries. Between 
1980 and 1983, both producer and consumer subsidies rose from $37,7 million 
to $126,5 million, an average annual increase of 78,5%. On September 2 
1983, the government reversed the trend by f irst reducing consumer subsidies -
by the t ime of the 1983 - 84 Budget total subsidies had fal len by 49%. 1 8 7 The 
removal of subsidies had dramatic e f f e c t s on the prices of basic commodities. 
And wage earners suffered severely and saw losses of the gains made since 
independence as a result of increased minimum wages. Even the rural 
population who were supposed to benefit fared o f f badly. And if one takes 
the expenditure on the acquisition of land and resettlement as a more 
meaningful index of rural poverty - allocations to the lands were severely 
guillotined. And given the commercialisation of food production which 
increasingly necessitated the purchase of food, rural households, who too 
are largely dependent on remittances from the urban areas, experienced 
substantial declines in their standards of living. 
These measures fai led to achieve the desired e f f e c t s of subsidising cheap 
wage food policies, because of the f r e e ze on wages. And as we noted above 
the wage food sector was the only exception to the general trend of decline 
in the manufacturing sector. From 1981 to 1983 the volume of food 
production rose by 30%. This expansion was achieved by the diversification 
away from the luxury food items to the basics. 
The next sub-sections will analyse the e f f e c t of state credit policies 
and product pricing and marketing policies on agricultural production. 
State Credit and Agriculture Since 1980. 
An important legacy of the pre-independence state credit policies was that the 
heavy indebtedness of commercial farmers resulted in the over capitalisation 
of land. And given that the 'commercial ' definition of 'utilised' land is 
not presently applied in the real physical sense of utilisation but also 
incorporates the 'market' value - under the willing buyer/willing seller 
system imposed at Lancaster House - the state in acquiring land has found 
itself paying o f f the debts accumulated by commercial farmers during U.D.I. 
The credit pool for agriculture by 1983 was in excess of 400 million dollars. 
This was monopolised by one group of recipients - the large-scale commercial 
farmers - who were receiving above 90% of short-term and medium-term credit, 
85% of livestock loans from the Cold Storage Commission and all the long-
1 88 
term credit. This has not been because the state has continued to dis-
criminate against Afr ican farmers, but rather due to the limits to which a given 
unit of land can economically absorb additional inputs in the form of ferti l isers 
etc . And as far as medium-term credit, the land holding size is the technical 
unit which determines the feasible implements that can be used as well as the 
scale of operations. The catt le finance scheme has not been extended to 
communal areas on a significant scale because of fears for overstocking. 
The amount budgeted for communal areas in the 1982/83 year was underspend. 
A gross anomaly in the credit situation has been the fac t that local resources 
are still being made available to individuals in the form of long-term loans 
to buy ' large tracts of land in commercial areas which the state was starved 
1 89 
of funds to acquire land for resett lement ' . 
State credit has however been an important element in preserving the fabric 
of the commercial farmers during the drought, when most farmers found 
themselves unable to pay o f f short-term loans used to finance annual inputs 
like fert i l iser, seed, pesticides and petrol. The total short-term debt to banks 
and the Agricultural Finance Corporation rose from Z$ 124,7 million in 1980 to 
Z$203,7 million in 1983, and reached Z$260 million in April 1984. A Commercial 
Farmers Union spokesman was quoted as saying then: 
"It has reached a point where many farmers have l i tt le hope of 
retiring their short-term loans. Even a superior crop would not 
necessarily help given present pricing policies. If something is ^ q 
not done the banks will end up owning a lot of farms next year". 
It still remains to be seen whether the expected bumper harvest will improve 
the debt situation of the commercial farmers. 
Communal farmers on the other hand have been saved from this plight by their 
very poverty. The drought resulted in a loss of l ivestock and in certain areas 
they were forced to eat their seed. 
Credit expansion to communal and small-scale commercial sectors has constituted 
an average of 10% of short-term credit, and about 30% of medium-term credit. 
Most of this has been provided by a World Bank loan which ends in 1986, and an 
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E.E.C. grant, so that a miniscule amount o f national resources have been 
mobilised for this expansion - which factor is likely to put pressure on 
191 the balance of payments position of the country. 
And even where agricultural credit has been extended from the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation, it has been the economically better o f f who have been 
the main recipients (judged by their access to land having an average of 
6,1 acres, compared with 4,8 acres for non-recipients and livestock 
having an average of 6,5 head of catt le compared with 2,9 for non-recipients).1 
There were about 26 co-operatives in 1983, but their only source of credit 
has been the Agricultural Finance Corporation, with other sources closed 
to them. As one researcher has remarked this has serious implications for 
the transition to socialism: 
"If a major socialist transformation of agrarian relations is to be 
e f f e c t ed , then unless access to those credit resources which are 
controlled by the other privately owned institutions which for 
the same reasons that they are denying the existent producer 
col lect ives would continue to withhold the credit , lack of resources 
would prove a fundamental constraint to the whole agrarian revolution 
Pricing and Marketing of Food Products Since 1980 and Changing Food 
Production Patterns. 
In 1980, in order to forestal l what was expected to be a post-war famine the 
Minister of Agriculture announced a pre-planting price for maize of $120 
per tonne for the 1981/82 marketing year. This was. 41 per cent above the 
1980/81 price and almost double that of two years previously. Following 
this large increase the maize price was held constant for three years. 
However in real terms (using 1964 as a base year the price declined by 
194 
25% in 1981 - 82 - 1983 - 84). As a measure to provide incentives a f ter 
drought a minimum guaranteed price of $140 for 1983/84 was announced. With 
the continuation of the drought the state found it necessary to announce a 
pre-planting price of $180 per tonne in July representing an increase of 
29%. 
The Grain Marketing Board selling price was raised by $20 per tonne to $157 
per tonne with e f f e c t f rom September 1983. Prior to this, the selling price 
of $137 per tonne had remained in e f f e c t since the beginning of the 1981/82 
195 season. 
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The State attempted to move away from the whole system of announcing pre-
planting prices, but given prevailing circumstances had to resort to it. 
Commercial farmers have however persistently claimed that the government 
a f ter independence fai led to ensure the largest possible harvest of maize (a 
controlled crop) by setting the producer's pre-planting price high enough to 
encourage maximum planting. The $140 per tonne announced in 1983 was 
considered barely a breakeven price. The arefa planted to maize in the 
large-scale commercial farm sector dropped 17% to about 190 000 hectares as 
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farmers switched to safer, more drought-resistant crops like cotton. 
As we have seen in earlier sections of the paper, this was not the f irst 
t ime 'commercial farmers had made such a switch - having done so a f ter 
the Second World War. And a f ter the 1974 oil shock, the acreage planted 
to maize had decreased in the large-scale commercial farm sector - partly as 
a result of the fai lure of the government to satisfy their demands for 
higher pre-planting prices. The shift was discernible from 1982/83 when 
though the bulk of maize deliveries was from the large-scale sector, there 
was a significant upturn in the proportion of the total crop delivered by 
Afr ican producers in the former purchase areas and the communal areas. " 
Deliveries f rom these sectors increased only marginally from 363 000 tonnes 
in 1981/82 to 396 000 tonnes in 1982/83. Due to the reduced acreage 
and production in the large-scale commercial sector, the percentage of 
total deliveries f rom these sectors rose f rom 18 to 26 per cent in the same 
years. In the f i ve -year period 1976/77 to 1980/81, deliveries f rom 
Afr ican producers averaged 71 000 tonnes or approximately 11 per cent of the 
total estimated production. The deliveries to the G.M.B. in 1981/82 
increased to 363 000 tonnes which was approximately 33 per cent of the 
estimated production. A further increase occurred in 1982/83 when deliveries 
197 rose to 369 000 tonnes or 55% of estimated production. 
The shift away from maize by large-scale commercial farmers cannot be attributed 
solely to the lack of ' incentives' in the pre-planting prices nor to the 
drought - but rather to the change in the pricing sytem prevailing before 
independence, whereby, when basic maize prices tended to increase to world 
price levels because of either a poor crop or increased internal demand, the 
settler state had resorted to imports in order to hold prices down and thus 
reduced the pressure on wages. In April 1984, private economists were fore -
casting maize shortages of as much as 700 000 tonnes. And in all, more than 
250 000 tonnes of maize was imported at a cost of almost U.S.$100 million - a 
staggering drain on the country's reserves. But when the final crop was 
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delivered, as had happened in 1965/66, and 1974/75 - the harvest had been 
underestimated - this t ime by 50%. The underestimation has been variably 
attributed to 'a freakish spate of late rains that somehow produced the best 
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possible yields from peasant land1. 
But the so-called miracle of the unexpected maize surplus from Afr ican 
maize producers is not just a matter of statistical quirks and oddities - but 
rather a ref lect ion of the pricing system inherited - where maize had to 
be imported, both to protect beef producers and suppress wages even when there 
was no shortage. The form in which o f f i c ia l statistics for agricultural 
production are col lected, which attempt to calculate the proportions of 
directly produced forms of consumption and purchased forms of consumption, 
without taking into account historical changes in food habits, which would 
indicate that purchased forms of consumption have become more important. 
This misconception has therefore led to much circular theorising on the 
'surprise'of the 1984 harvest. One merchant bank economist declared: 
"This feature makes the 1984 figures even more startling, as it is 
known that in 1981 the pricing structure was such that many farmers 
sold all their whole grain to the Marketing Board and bought back their 
milled grain requirements at a lower price. In 1984 this anomaly 
in the pricing structure has been corrected with +he result that 
substantial quantities of grain production did not enter the 
marketing system". ' ^ 
While in the early seventies export sales were consistently higher than local 
sales, only in the latter part of the decade was the trend reversed, largely 
because of reduced acreage by commercial farmers. A f t e r independence, the 
trend was reversed because of demand factors - by 1980/81, local sales had 
reached 723 586 tonnes, the main reason being the feeding of returned refugees 
a f ter the war. In 1981/82 sales dropped by 8 per cent to 664 000 tonnes 
due to the discontinuation of the feeding programmes. In 1982/83, sales 
rose by 57% to reach 1 041 639 tonnes, 23% above the forecasted demand. 
This was not only as a result of farmers buying back their maize in milled 
form, but because of purchases by the Department of Social Services for drought-
.. , 200 
rel ie f . 
The unprecedented sales levels which began in the latter half of 1982/83 and 
continued in 1983/84. A record of 1 273 240 tonnes were sold - 22 per cent 
above 1982/83. The Department of Social Services increased its purchases to 
223 900 tonnes, almost f i v e times the amount purchased the previous year. 
The demand for 1984/85 was originally projected at 1,75 million tonnes - but 
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due to consumer resistance to yellow maize, sales were not expected to reach 1 
201 
million tonnes. 
Wheat also shows some interesting relationships between production and consu-
mption. The area planted to wheat showed an increasing trend until 1982, 
when it peaked at 37 329 hectares. But with the shortage of water and 
suspension of water rights, hectarage planted to wheat fe l l by 42 per cent to 
21 504 h.a. Further declines were registered in 1984. Deliveries of wheat 
by the large-scale commercial sector peaked at 200 734 tonnes, before falling 
by 41 per cent to 117 444 tonnes in 1983. A t the same time, the state sector 
increased its share. Production on A R D A (Agricultural and Rural Development 
Authority) rose dramatically to reach 17 337 tonnes, an increase of 121 per cent 
202 on the previous year's crops of 7 854 tonnes. 
In 1983/84, the producer price for wheat was set at $220 per tonne - a $30 
increase over 1982/83, and $55 above the 1981/82 price. Although the 
producer price showed a $55 per tonne increase in the two years in terms of 
the def lated value (1964 prices), the prices actually fe l l by $1,52 in the 
same period. In 1984/85 the producer price was set at $250 per tonne, a 14 
per cent increase. Wheat exports were stopped in January 1983, and Zimbabwe 
had to resort to aid to meet the shortfalls in demand. Local production has 
been unable to keep pace with demand - as has been revealed by the periodic 
203 bread shortages in 1984. 
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
The most important change in food habits in Zimbabwe over the last 100 years 
has been the shift to purchase items of consumption. This has however 
had the unfortunate consequences of increasing the control of transnational 
capital on the economy. Given the nutritional def iciencies as a result 
of the largely maize-based diet, the move towards commercial consumption, 
should, if the power of transnational capital in the food chain is reduced, be 
able to provide for a more varied diet. There is also a need to increase 
the diversif ication of cropping in the communal areas - as dietary imbalances 
have been caused by the limitations on the variety of food produced and consumed, 
related in turn to low cropping intensity and the low productivity of non-
staples. | 
Research is going on into the production and processing of more drought-
resistant cereals - sorghums and millets. But it is doubtful whether 
food habits could be changed to increase demand for these. As we noted in 
previous sections of the paper - the palatability of these is largely dependent 
on the variety in the relish. So that if a switch back to the more 
nutritious sorghums amd millet is envisaged it should take place at the 
same t ime - with the development of fisheries, and moves to make game meat 
more available - to the population possibly by the Cold Storage Commission 
extending its operations, to include game. 
The goals of food sel f-suff ic iency in post-independent Zimbabwe have produced 
a clear tension between the goals of expanding popular consumption and the 
need to increase rapidly the rate of capital accumulation. Constraints in the 
transition food strategy have emerged from firstly the structural characteristics 
of the social and economic model inherited from the past, and secondly from 
conjuctural tension in the form of the international recession and drought. 
Thus the production structure inherited was designed to meet the needs of the 
agro-export sector and a high-income minority but not the basic needs of people 
or of autonomous national development. In attempting to redress this 
situation, however, d i f f icult ies have been posed by the economy's vulnerability 
to fluctuations in international commodity markets, and the high level of 
dependence on imports of key inputs such as machinery. 
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Within budgetary constraints imposed by these factors - the resett lement 
programme whose main aim has been inter-alia to abolish the geo-polit ical 
marginality of large regions of the country, has had to be decelerated. 
The state's food strategy has attempted to restructure the market for - on-
agricultural consumer goods and since Independence there has been an 
expansion in previously severely limited infrastructure for health, education 
and other basic services. 
/ 
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